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Abstract
At work, sources of anxiety abound. Individuals worry about the quality of their work, their job security,
and impressing their bosses. At the same time, many managers induce anxiety, incidentally or
deliberately, in an effort to motivate their employees. Until now, the study of anxiety in organizations has
been surprisingly sparse. Previous anxiety research has focused on anxiety as a personality trait. In
contrast, I focus on state anxiety, an unpleasant emotional state triggered by novelty and the potential for
adverse consequences, which has profound effects on cognition and behavior.
Across three chapters, I examine the intrapersonal experience and interpersonal effects of state anxiety.
Using a variety of methods, including survey, archival, and experimental data, I test the influence of
anxiety on negotiations, advice taking, emotional reappraisal, and high-pressure performance. In Chapter
1, I find that anxious negotiators tend to make low first offers, exit prematurely, and ultimately obtain
worse outcomes. In Chapter 2, I find that feeling anxious leads individuals to rely more heavily on advice,
even when the advice is obviously bad. These effects are mediated by low self-efficacy; Feeling anxious
lowers self-efficacy, which causes negotiators to exit negotiations and causes individuals to rely more
heavily on others' advice. Finally, in Chapter 3, I investigate a counterintuitive strategy to contend with the
harmful effects of anxiety: reappraising anxiety as excitement. I find that, compared to the intuition to
calm down or reduce anxiety, reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement primes an opportunity
mindset (as opposed to a threat mindset) and improves subsequent performance across public and
private performance tasks.
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ABSTRACT
WORRY AT WORK: HOW STATE ANXIETY INFLUENCES NEGOTIATIONS,
ADVICE, REAPPRAISAL, AND PERFORMANCE
Alison Wood Brooks
Maurice E. Schweitzer

At work, sources of anxiety abound. Individuals worry about the quality of their
work, their job security, and impressing their bosses. At the same time, many managers
induce anxiety, incidentally or deliberately, in an effort to motivate their employees.
Until now, the study of anxiety in organizations has been surprisingly sparse. Previous
anxiety research has focused on anxiety as a personality trait. In contrast, I focus on state
anxiety, an unpleasant emotional state triggered by novelty and the potential for adverse
consequences, which has profound effects on cognition and behavior.
Across three chapters, I examine the intrapersonal experience and interpersonal
effects of state anxiety. Using a variety of methods, including survey, archival, and
experimental data, I test the influence of anxiety on negotiations, advice taking,
emotional reappraisal, and high-pressure performance. In Chapter 1, I find that anxious
negotiators tend to make low first offers, exit prematurely, and ultimately obtain worse
outcomes. In Chapter 2, I find that feeling anxious leads individuals to rely more heavily
on advice, even when the advice is obviously bad. These effects are mediated by low
self-efficacy; Feeling anxious lowers self-efficacy, which causes negotiators to exit
negotiations and causes individuals to rely more heavily on others’ advice. Finally, in
Chapter 3, I investigate a counterintuitive strategy to contend with the harmful effects of
anxiety: reappraising anxiety as excitement. I find that, compared to the intuition to calm
down or reduce anxiety, reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement primes an
opportunity mindset (as opposed to a threat mindset) and improves subsequent
performance across public and private performance tasks.
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INTRODUCTION
Anxiety is extremely common. In the workplace, individuals worry about the
quality of their work, their job security, meeting deadlines, and impressing their
colleagues and bosses. At the same time, many managers induce anxiety, incidentally or
deliberately, in an effort to motivate their employees. Outside of work, people worry
about short-term threats like whether they left the coffee-maker on in the morning, as
well as long-term threats and values like their health, finances, and family.
Understanding anxiety is important not only because it is pervasive, but also
because feeling anxious profoundly influences cognition and behavior (e.g., Eysenck,
1997; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). For example, recent work demonstrates how
anxiety interferes with cognitive reasoning (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007) and causes people
to avoid risk (e.g., Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).
Previous anxiety research has largely focused on anxiety as a personality trait
similar to neuroticism (e.g., Eysenck, 1979, 1992; Kantor et al., 2001; Spielberger,
1985). In this dissertation, however, I focus on state anxiety, an unpleasant emotional
state triggered by novelty and/or the potential for adverse consequences (Brooks &
Schweitzer, 2011), an emotional state anyone can experience at any time.
I fundamentally advance anxiety research by providing a concrete definition of
state anxiety: “a state of distress and/or physiological arousal in reaction to stimuli
including novel situations and the potential for undesirable outcomes” (Brooks &
Schweitzer, 2011). In other words, anxiety is a discrete emotion experienced internally
as physiological arousal (e.g., increased heart rate) paired with negative cognitive
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appraisal (e.g., threat). Consistent with prior work (e.g., Gray, 1991), I conceptualize
anxiety to include fear, worry, apprehension, and nervousness. Anxious feelings can be
short-lived or long-lasting, and the magnitude of anxiety can range from minor (e.g.,
worry) to dramatic (e.g., fear). Within Russell’s (1980) affective circumplex model,
anxiety is high in activation (i.e., arousal) and unpleasantness (i.e., negative valence),
and within Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal framework, anxiety is characterized
by high uncertainty and a lack of control (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).
Though the experience of state anxiety is intrapersonal, the world is inherently
social. As individuals navigate interactions and relationships, feeling and expressing
anxiety may have profound interpersonal consequences as well. Until now, the
interpersonal consequences of state anxiety have been largely overlooked by
organizational scholars.
In this dissertation, I focus on state anxiety in two separate interpersonal domains
that have fascinated organizational scholars and are often characterized by feeling
anxious: negotiations and advice. The prospect of negotiating makes people feel very
anxious, and individuals often seek out and rely on advice from others when they feel
anxious or uncertain about their own judgments.
In addition to examining the effects of anxiety in these interpersonal domains, I
also turn my attention to the intrapersonal regulation of anxiety. Previous research in
anxiety regulation has focused on suppressing or decreasing the experience and/or
expression of anxiety. However, the arousal associated with anxiety is automatic and
very difficult to hide or diminish. Instead of trying to calm down or hide anxious
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feelings, I investigate an alternative strategy: reappraising anxiety as excitement, another
high-arousal emotion that tends to improve cognition and performance.
Overview of Chapter 1
In Chapter 1 (co-authored with Maurice E. Schweitzer), I examine the effects of
feeling anxious prior to and during negotiations. In a series of experimental studies, we
demonstrate that state anxiety is the most commonly anticipated negotiator emotion, and
feeling anxious motivates flight behaviors across several negotiation and bargaining
contexts. Compared to non-anxious individuals, anxious negotiators make lower first
offers, respond more quickly to counteroffers, make steeper concessions, and exit
prematurely, sacrificing value and achieving poorer negotiated outcomes. These effects
are moderated by negotiator self-efficacy. When negotiators believe they are good
negotiators (i.e., high negotiator self-efficacy), they can avoid the negative effects of
state anxiety.
Chapter 1 makes several theoretical contributions. First, this work addresses a
gap in the emotion and negotiation literature. Though previous work has emphasized the
importance of emotions in negotiations (Van Kleef et al., 2004), no work has
investigated the role of state anxiety, the most pervasive negotiator emotion. Second, we
fundamentally advance the negotiation literature by showing that negotiator self-efficacy
is both labile and consequential.
Overview of Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Francesca Gino and Maurice E. Schweitzer), I
shift focus to another organizationally-relevant interpersonal domain characterized by
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anxiety: advice. When individuals face important decisions, such as how to invest
savings or how to complete a difficult task, they often feel anxious and seek advice from
colleagues and managers. Across eight experiments, we describe the influence of
anxiety on advice seeking and advice taking. We find that anxious individuals are more
likely to seek and rely on advice than are those in a neutral emotional state. Supporting
our findings in Chapter 1, the relationships between anxiety and advice seeking and
anxiety and advice taking are mediated by self-confidence; anxiety lowers selfconfidence, which increases advice seeking and reliance upon advice. Finally, we find
that anxious individuals fail to discriminate between good and bad advice, and between
advice from advisors with and without a conflict of interest.
Overview of Chapter 3
Taken together, Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate that feeling anxious can harm
important interpersonal outcomes. However, the experience of anxiety is inherently
intrapersonal (physiological and cognitive). In Chapter 3, I examine the intrapersonal
regulation of state anxiety. I find that most people believe the best way to contend with
pre-performance anxiety is try to decrease anxiety or calm down. However, decreasing
anxiety is very difficult because arousal is automatic.
Instead, I test an alternative strategy: reappraising pre-performance anxiety as
excitement. The experience of anxiety and excitement is quite similar. They are both felt
in anticipation of events and are characterized by high arousal. However, whereas
anxiety is a negative, aversive emotion that harms performance, excitement is a positive,
pleasant emotion that can improve performance (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky,
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1993; Jamieson et al., 2010). Because these two emotions are arousal congruent, I find
that minimal interventions can shift anxiety to produce genuine feelings of excitement
(Schachter & Singer, 1962).
Across several experimental studies and an archival field study, I find that
individuals who reappraise their pre-performance anxiety as excitement—compared to
those who try to calm down—increase their self-confidence, adopt an opportunity
mindset (as opposed to a threat mindset), and improve their subsequent public speaking,
karaoke singing, and math performance. These findings are consistent with archival field
data from the popular television show “American Idol.”
This work makes several theoretical and methodological contributions. First, it
dives deeply into an important omission in the emotion regulation literature. Previous
work has not considered the role of arousal congruency during emotional reappraisal,
and very few empirical studies have directly compared different substrategies of
reappraisal (Shiota & Levenson, 2012). Second, this research challenges a body of work
about misrepresenting emotions. Previous work suggests that inauthentic emotional
displays differ from authentic expressions, and that deliberate attempts to express
inauthentic emotions are an act of emotional labor that can be physically and
psychologically costly (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Grandey, 2000,
2003; Cote, 2005; Morris & Feldman, 1996). In contrast, pre-performance anxiety and
excitement serve as a counterexample to these findings. Third, this research points to the
labile nature that can exist between two seemingly discrete and disparate emotions, such
as anxiety and excitement.
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Summary
Chapters 1-3 demonstrate that state anxiety is extremely common, profoundly
influences interpersonal cognition and behavior, and can be managed intrapersonally
with arousal-congruent reappraisal. Feeling anxious harms performance in negotiations
and causes individuals to rely too heavily on advice. However, individuals can
reappraise pre-performance anxiety as excitement with minimal interventions such as
positive self-talk (e.g., saying “I am excited” out loud).
Building on the affective circumplex model of emotion (e.g., Posner,Russell, &
Peterson, 2005), the findings from this dissertation suggest an integrated framework of
state anxiety, excitement, and calmness (see diagram below). Though people aspire and
attempt to move from anxiety to calmness (and often fail), people can successfully move
from anxiety to excitement. This framework shows that people attempt to regulate
anxiety by shifting both their arousal and valence. A far more effective approach for
regulating anxiety is to shift only valence, holding arousal constant.
HIGH AROUSAL

Anxiety

Excitement

NEGATIVE
VALENCE

POSITIVE
VALENCE

Calmness

LOW AROUSAL
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CHAPTER 1.
CAN NERVOUS NELLY NEGOTIATE? HOW ANXIETY CAUSES
NEGOTIATORS TO MAKE LOW FIRST OFFERS, EXIT EARLY, AND EARN
LESS PROFIT

Alison Wood Brooks
Maurice E. Schweitzer

Published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes on March 2nd, 2011.

ABSTRACT
Negotiations trigger anxiety. Across four studies, we demonstrate that anxiety is harmful
to negotiator performance. In our experiments, we induced either anxiety or neutral
feelings and studied behavior in negotiation and continuous shrinking pie tasks.
Compared to negotiators experiencing neutral feelings, negotiators who feel anxious
expect lower outcomes, make lower first offers, respond more quickly to offers, exit
bargaining situations earlier, and ultimately obtain worse outcomes. The relationship
between anxiety and negotiator behavior is moderated by negotiator self-efficacy; high
self-efficacy mitigates the harmful effects of anxiety.
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CAN NERVOUS NELLY NEGOTIATE? HOW ANXIETY CAUSES
NEGOTIATORS TO MAKE LOW FIRST OFFERS, EXIT EARLY, AND EARN
LESS PROFIT

In almost every social and organizational setting, people face the challenge of
negotiating with others to achieve their goals (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993; Rapoport, Budescu, Erev, & Zwick, 1998). Although a substantial literature has
developed our understanding of negotiations (see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley,
2000 for a review), relatively little work has explored how emotions influence negotiator
behavior. Important work that has studied emotions in negotiations has focused almost
exclusively on anger and happiness (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Barry, 2008; Van Kleef, De
Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Surprisingly, prior research has not directly studied one of the
most ubiquitous negotiator emotions: anxiety. In this paper, we demonstrate that anxiety
is commonly felt before negotiating and harmful to both negotiator behavior and
negotiated outcomes.
Moods and Emotions
Both moods and emotions can influence negotiations. Moods are diffuse feelings
characterized by either positive or negative valence (Forgas, 1998). In contrast to
moods, emotions are discrete, intense, and complex feelings that last for shorter
durations (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Unlike moods that are characterized along a single
dimension, valence (good to bad), emotions can be characterized along several
dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, anger, sadness, and guilt are all
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negatively-valenced emotions, but these emotions differ along the dimension of control;
anger is typically triggered by another person, sadness is typically triggered by a
situation, and guilt is typically triggered by one’s own actions.
In this paper, we study incidental emotion. Incidental emotions are triggered by a
prior, unrelated situation (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). For example, a
colleague you meet for lunch may feel angry about a disagreement she had with her
spouse earlier in the day. In contrast to incidental emotions, directed emotions are
triggered by aspects of the situation itself. Though negotiations are likely to be
influenced by both incidental and directed emotions, in our studies, we induce incidental
anxiety. Because they are normatively irrelevant (i.e., not related to the task at hand),
incidental emotions offer a conservative approach for studying the influence of emotions
on judgment and behavior (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005).
Affect in Negotiations
Early work studied the influence of mood on negotiations. This work found that
positive moods promote cooperative behavior, and that negative moods promote
competitive behavior (Barry & Oliver, 1996). In particular, positive moods increase
concession making, stimulate creative problem solving, and increase preferences for
cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990; Forgas, 1998). In contrast,
negative moods decrease initial offers, decrease joint gains, promote the rejection of
ultimatum offers, and increase the use of competitive strategies in negotiations (Forgas,
1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).
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More recent research has studied the effects of specific emotions on negotiations.
This work has identified a number of important relationships between specific emotions
and negotiator behavior (e.g., Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Beest, Van
Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). For example,
negotiators concede more to someone who expresses anger than they do to someone
who expresses happiness (Van Kleef et al., 2004). Feeling angry, however, can harm
negotiators’ ability to reach integrative outcomes (Allred et al., 1997). In addition to
investigating anger, negotiation scholars have studied emotions including envy,
disappointment, guilt, and regret (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). For
example, negotiators who feel envy are more likely to lie to their envied counterpart
(Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). The relationships between specific emotions and
negotiator behavior are moderated by a number of factors such as the target of the
emotion (e.g., whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a specific behavior)
and the number of people negotiating. In extant research, anger and happiness are the
most commonly studied emotions in negotiations (Allred et al., 1997; Van Dijk, Van
Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004). Surprisingly, the literature
on emotions in negotiations has neglected the study of anxiety. This is an important
omission because anxiety may be one of the most pervasive negotiator emotions
(Wheeler, 2004).
Anxiety
Although prior work has studied anxiety as a trait, a motive, and a drive (Endler,
1983), we consider anxiety as a state emotion that arises in response to a threat. We
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integrate prior research on stress and trait anxiety (Gray, 1991; Greenhalgh, 2002;
Kantor, Endler, Heslegrave, Kocovski, 2001; O’Connor, Arnold, Maurizio, 2010;
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Spielberger, 1966) to introduce the following definition of
state anxiety:
Anxiety is a state of distress and/or physiological arousal
in reaction to stimuli including novel situations and the
potential for undesirable outcomes.
Consistent with prior work (e.g., Gray, 1991), we define anxiety to include fear,
frustration, stress, tension, worry, apprehension, and nervousness. Within Russell’s
(1980) affective circumplex model, anxiety is high in activation and unpleasantness, and
within Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal framework, anxiety is characterized by
high uncertainty and a lack of control (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). We expect anxiety
to be particularly important in negotiations. Anxiety differs from other negativelyvalenced emotions, such as anger, because it triggers a “flight” rather than a “fight”
response (Marks & Nesse, 1994). For example, whereas feelings of anger motivate
individuals to escalate conflict, feelings of anxiety motivate individuals to escape or
avoid conflict.
A few scholars have speculated that anxiety may be important for negotiations
(Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007;
Wheeler, 2004). For example, Babcock, Gelfand, Small, and Stayn (2006) suggest that
women may avoid negotiations because they feel anxious. In their studies, women were
more likely to avoid negotiations than men, and women were more likely than men to
report feeling anxiety and discomfort. Although anxiety may be a prevalent negotiator
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emotion, no prior work has directly investigated how anxiety influences negotiator
behavior.
Anxiety and Flight in Negotiations
Anxiety is triggered by novel situations that have the potential for undesirable
outcomes (Gray, 1991). In many negotiations, such as the process of purchasing a home,
the situation involves unfamiliar people, unfamiliar issues, and the prospect of
unfavorable outcomes (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). For example, an unsuccessful
negotiator may upset a counterpart, obtain an adverse outcome, or both. Almost every
negotiation is characterized by the potential for undesirable outcomes, and as a result,
we expect negotiation settings to trigger anxiety.
Anxiety is an aversive state that motivates individuals to escape or flee from
anxiety-producing situations (Marks & Nesse, 1994). In our investigation, we study the
influence of adding incidental anxiety to negotiation and bargaining settings. We expect
individuals who feel high levels of anxiety to be eager to escape from anxiety-producing
situations, such as negotiation and bargaining situations.
We consider two ways in which individuals might escape from negotiation and
bargaining situations. First, individuals can terminate the process and exit negotiations
without reaching a deal. Compared to individuals who experience neutral feelings, we
expect individuals who feel anxious to be more likely to exit negotiation and bargaining
situations early.
Second, anxious individuals may seek to reach a quick agreement, even when
persisting might yield a better economic outcome. To increase the likelihood of reaching

13
a quick agreement, individuals may lower their aspirations, lower their expectations,
make low first offers, respond quickly to offers, and make quick concessions. Compared
to individuals who experience neutral feelings, we expect individuals who feel anxious
to be more likely to lower their aspirations, lower their expectations, make low first
offers, and respond more quickly to offers.
We expect anxiety to harm outcomes. Behaviors triggered by anxiety, such as
developing low aspirations and expectations (Brophy, 1983), making low first offers
(Galinsky, Seidin, Kim, & Medvec, 2002; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968; Neale
& Bazerman, 1991; Yukl, 1974), and exiting early (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert,
2000) have each been linked with poor negotiation outcomes. As a result, compared to
individuals who experience neutral feelings, we expect individuals who feel anxiety to
attain worse negotiation and bargaining outcomes.
In our studies, we also consider self-efficacy, the belief that one can succeed, as a
potential moderator of the relationship between anxiety and bargaining behavior.
Individuals with high self-efficacy persist in tasks longer than do individuals with
moderate or low self-efficacy (Lenta, Browna, & Larkina, 1984). In our investigation,
we expect individuals with high self-efficacy to persist in bargaining tasks longer than
those with moderate self-efficacy, even when they feel anxious.
Pilot Survey
Although a few scholars have suggested that anxiety is important for
negotiations (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Wheeler, 2004), extant research has
neither documented its importance nor directly studied the influence of anxiety on
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negotiations. To motivate our investigation, we conducted a pilot study with an adult
population.
Method
Participants. We recruited participants from a large Northeastern train station to
complete a one-page survey in exchange for a candy bar. A total of 185 participants (67
female, 84 male) completed the survey. Most respondents had more than three years of
work experience (88%), and on average, participants were 38.6 years old (SD = 16.11).
Design and Procedure. The survey contained three sections. In the first section,
we asked participants to imagine that they and a stranger were about to negotiate, and to
rank the three emotions that they would feel the most before the negotiation. For the
ranking task, we gave participants a list of the eight most common emotions from the
PANAS basic emotion scale (Happy, Sad, Excited, Guilty, Anxious, Proud, Calm,
Angry).
In the second section, we asked participants to imagine “negotiating for a car”
and “negotiating for a higher salary.” For both of these scenarios, we asked participants
to rate the extent to which they would feel each of five emotions using a 5-point scale
(Happy, Sad, Anxious, Excited, Angry).
In the third section, we asked participants to provide demographic information
(gender and age).
Results and Discussion
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In the first section of the survey, participants ranked the emotions they expected
to feel before a generic negotiation. A majority of participants (61.08%, 113 out of 185)
ranked anxiety as the emotion they would feel the most before a negotiation.
In the second section, when participants imagined negotiating over the
acquisition of a car, excitement was rated most highly (M = 3.64, SD = 1.06) and
anxiety was rated second-most highly (M = 3.27, SD = 1.16). In a repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA), we found significant differences between the
participants’ five emotion ratings, F(4, 158) = 149.53, p < .0001, η2 = .487. When
participants imagined negotiating for a higher salary, anxiety was rated most highly of
the five emotions (M = 3.71, SD = 1.15). In a repeated-measures ANOVA, we found
significant differences between the participants’ five emotion ratings, F(4, 161) =
145.40, p < .0001, η2 = .474. We depict participants’ emotion ratings in Figures 1 and 2.
------------------------------------Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
-------------------------------------Both men and women expected to feel high levels of anxiety. Though we found
no significant gender differences, our results are directionally consistent with Babcock et
al.’s (2006) conjecture; women anticipated feeling slightly more anxiety than did men
(and men anticipated feeling slightly more excitement than did women).
Although prior negotiation work has studied anger and happiness, this work has
neglected the study of anxiety. Results from our pilot study reveal that anxiety is
commonly felt before negotiating.
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Study 1
In Study 1, we explore the influence of anxiety on negotiation processes and
outcomes. In this study, we induce either anxious or neutral feelings and ask participants
to complete a free-form negotiation task based on the cell-phone negotiation case
developed by Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004). In this study, participants
negotiated with each other via computer instant messaging.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty six students at a Northeastern university
participated in the study for pay (81 female, 55 male). Participants received a $10 showup fee and had the opportunity to make up to an additional $15.20 based on their
decisions and the decisions of others in the experiment. On average, participants were
20.1 years old (SD = 1.46).
Design. We randomly assigned participants to one of two between-subject
conditions: Anxiety vs. Neutral. We induced anxiety or neutral emotions by having
participants listen to music via headphones during the negotiation. Prior research has
used music to manipulate mood and emotions (e.g., Pham, 1998; see Brown & Volgsten,
2006 for a review). As a cover story, we informed participants that they would be asked
to evaluate the music as part of a separate study.
In the Anxiety condition, we had participants listen to the theme from the movie
Psycho. In the neutral condition, we had participants listen to Handel’s Water Music:
Air. Both of these audio clips are orchestral compositions with no vocal parts. The
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segments we used were approximately three minutes in length, and we played these clips
on a continuous loop.
Pilot Study. We conducted a pilot study to check the effectiveness of our audio
clip inductions. We recruited a non-overlapping sample of 162 participants who
completed a series of studies in exchange for $10. Participants listened to either the
anxiety or the neutral clip and rated their emotions while they listened. To measure
anxiety, we averaged responses for anxious, apprehensive, worried, and nervous
(=.86). To measure neutral feelings, we averaged responses for neutral, indifferent,
unemotional, and calm (=.91).
As expected, mean ratings of anxiety were higher in the Anxiety condition than
in the Neutral condition, t(160)=10.00, p<.001, and mean neutral feelings were higher in
the Neutral condition than they were in the Anxiety condition, t(160)=6.41, p<.001.
Importantly, ratings of other emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, disgust) did not differ across
conditions. We report these results in Table 1.
Procedure. For each session, we recruited even numbers of participants. Our
minimum group size was six and the maximum group size was fourteen. After
participants arrived, we seated participants in separate cubicles in front of computers
with headphones. Participants read all of the instructions and completed the
experimental tasks, including the negotiation, via computer.
First, we asked participants to complete an instant messaging practice round to
ensure familiarity with the instant messaging platform. Next, participants read
background information and prepared for the negotiation task. We then had participants
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put on headphones. As a cover story, we informed participants that they would be asked
to evaluate music as part of a separate study. Participants listened to either the anxiety or
the neutral music. While the music played, participants reported their aspiration levels
(“What do you hope to earn in the negotiation?”) and expectations (“What do you expect
to earn in the negotiation?”). After responding to these two questions, participants
negotiated with their counterpart.
Participants negotiated via instant message, and we recorded the text of their
negotiation. After participants negotiated, we collected demographic information and
paid participants based on the outcome of their negotiation.
Negotiation Task. Consistent with prior emotion and negotiation research, we
used a three-issue cell-phone shipment negotiation (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van
Kleef et al., 2004). We informed participants that they would be randomly assigned to
the role of either buyer or seller.
Participants negotiated the price, warranty period, and service period of a cell
phone shipment with their counterpart. Price was a distributive issue (i.e., win-lose), and
warranty period and service period had integrative potential. Participants could expand
the size of the total dyadic outcome by trading across these issues. We provided
participants with a payoff chart that represented payoffs associated with nine different
levels of outcomes for each of the three issues. We depict the Buyer and Seller payoff
charts in Table 2. Sellers preferred a high price, short warranty period, and short service
period. Buyers preferred a low price, long warranty period, and long service period. The
maximum possible individual outcome for both buyers and sellers was $15.20. The
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minimum possible individual outcome was $0. The maximum possible joint outcome
was $17.60. The minimum possible joint outcome was $12.80.
We did not provide participants with their counterpart’s payoff table, but
participants understood that it differed from their own. We told participants that the
negotiation could end in one of three ways: they reached a deal, one of the negotiators
decided to exit by typing “EXIT,” or time ran out before they reached an agreement. We
gave participants 10 minutes to negotiate. If they reached an agreement, we told them
they would earn the negotiated amount. If one of the counterparts exited before the end
of the 10 minutes, we told them that both counterparts would earn $4. And if they did
not reach an agreement before the end of 10 minutes, we told them that both negotiators
would earn $0. Participants completed the negotiation task over an instant messaging
platform using an anonymous screenname (e.g., NegotiatorA, NegotiatorB).
Results
We report results for both the negotiation process and negotiated outcomes.
Across our analyses, we found no significant differences for age or gender, and we
report results collapsed across these variables.
Aspirations and Expectations. We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on aspiration level as a function of emotion condition (Anxiety v. Neutral) and role
(Buyer v. Seller). We did not find a significant effect of emotion on aspiration level (p =
.60). Anxious participants (M =$11.55, SD =3.60) aspired to earn as much as nonanxious participants did (M =$11.93, SD =3.50). We also did not find an effect of
negotiator role on aspiration level (p = .57).
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We conducted an ANOVA on expectations as a function of emotion condition
(Anxiety v. Neutral) and role (Buyer v. Seller). We found a significant effect of emotion
on expectations. Controlling for role, anxious participants expected to earn less (M
=$6.95, SD =2.57) than did non-anxious participants (M =$8.31, SD =2.97), F(1,139) =
8.46, p = .004. We found no effect of negotiator role on expectations (p = .79).
First Offers. Sixty five of the 136 participants made complete first offers that
specified values for all three issues. About half (31 of 65) of the first offers were made
by sellers.
We converted each three-issue initial offer into a total dollar value for the
participant who made the offer. We conducted an ANOVA on first offer value as a
function of emotion condition (Anxiety v. Neutral) and role (Buyer v. Seller). We found
a significant main effect of emotion condition on first offers. Anxious participants made
significantly lower first offers (M =$8.36, SD =1.63) than did non-anxious participants
(M =$9.55, SD =2.29), F(1,63) = 5.63, p = .021. We found no effect of negotiation role
on first offer (p = .93). These results are depicted in Figure 3.
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
------------------------------------Response Times. We measured response time (in seconds) for each message sent
during the negotiation. For each participant, we computed averaged response time. We
conducted an ANOVA on each participant’s mean response time as a function of the
negotiator’s emotion (Anxious v. Neutral), the counterpart’s emotion (Anxious v.
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Neutral), and the negotiator’s role (Buyer v. Seller). We found a significant main effect
of the negotiator’s emotion on response time. Anxious participants responded
significantly more quickly (M = 14.78 seconds, SD = 5.87) than did non-anxious
participants (M = 18.42 seconds, SD = 9.19), F(1,135) = 7.32, p = .008. We did not find
a main effect of the counterpart’s emotion (p = .70), a main effect of role (p = .28), or
interaction effects between the negotiator’s emotion, the counterpart’s emotion, or role
on response time.
Exit Decisions. Only four out of the 142 participants chose to exit before
reaching an agreement. Consistent with our predictions, all of the participants who chose
to exit were in the anxiety condition, but the total number who exited is too small for us
to draw inferences about exit decisions. We investigate exit decisions directly in Studies
3 and 4.
Individual Outcomes. Four dyads failed to reach agreement because one
negotiator chose to exit. We excluded these eight participants from our analysis of
negotiation outcomes. For each of the 134 participants who reached a deal, we computed
the total profit they earned.
We conducted an ANOVA on individual profit as a function of the negotiator’s
emotion, the counterpart’s emotion, and the negotiator’s role. We found a significant
main effect of the negotiator’s emotion on individual profit. Anxious participants earned
less profit (M =$7.19, SD =2.16) than did non-anxious participants (M = $8.04, SD
=1.56), F(1,130) = 8.53, p = .004. We also found a significant main effect of the
counterpart’s emotion on individual profit. Participants who were paired with an anxious
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counterpart earned significantly more profit (M =$7.99, SD =1.89) than did participants
who were paired with a non-anxious counterpart (M =$7.18, SD =1.92), F(1,129) =
6.03, p = .015. We did not find a significant interaction effect of the negotiator’s
emotion and the counterpart’s emotion (p = .40) or a significant main effect of the
negotiator’s role (p = .52) on individual outcomes. We report negotiated outcomes by
condition and role as well as the number of dyads per experimental condition in Table 3.
Expectations as Mediator. Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-step
mediation approach, we analyzed expectations as a mediator of the relationship between
anxiety and individual profit. We regressed emotion condition on individual profit.
Anxiety was a significant predictor of individual profit (β=-.903, SE = .314 p<.005). We
then regressed emotion condition and expectations on individual profit. By including
expectations in the model, the influence of anxiety on individual profit was reduced in
significance (from β=-.903, p=.0047 to β=-.729, p=.024), and we increased the amount
of explained variance from r2=.059 to r2=.093. This suggests that expectations partially
mediate the relationship between anxiety and individual profit.
Dyadic Outcomes. We conducted an ANOVA on the total profit dyads earned as
a function of the buyer’s emotion condition, the seller’s emotion condition, and an
interaction between the two. We did not find significant effects for the buyer’s emotion
condition (p = .78), the seller’s emotion condition (p = .75), or the interaction between
the two (p = .21) on dyadic profit.
Discussion
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Study 1 demonstrates that anxiety harms negotiation processes and outcomes. In
this study, anxious negotiators set lower expectations, made lower first offers, responded
more quickly to offers, and attained worse individual outcomes. Though anxiety caused
negotiators to lower their expectations, anxiety did not cause negotiators to lower their
aspirations. This pattern of results suggests that anxiety temporarily lowers negotiators’
self-efficacy, the belief that one can succeed in a negotiation (i.e, short-term
expectations), but does not influence long-term goals (i.e., aspirations). Importantly,
Study 1 lacked experimental control over some of our process measures. For example,
we did not control the amount of discussion participants had before they made their first
offers.
Study 2
In Study 2, we extend our investigation to explore the link between anxiety and
initial offers. The first offer is a critical element of negotiations because it anchors the
negotiation. In our setting, negotiators had a complete payoff matrix that bounded the
negotiation space. As a result, in our setting, the first offer represents the first
opportunity for negotiators to make concessions. Previous work has linked first offers
with subsequent patterns of concessions and, ultimately, negotiated outcomes (Galinsky,
Seidin, Kim, & Medvec, 2002; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968; Neale &
Bazerman, 1991; Yukl, 1974).
Unlike Study 1, we use a very controlled computer-mediated negotiation
procedure. We adapted this approach from Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2004).
Though this study lacks the interpersonal interaction of Study 1, it affords us greater
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control over issues such as the amount of information exchanged and self-selection
issues that might influence first offers. We also extend our investigation in Study 2 by
using a different emotion induction.
Method
Participants. We recruited 159 students at a Northeastern university to participate
in a laboratory experiment for pay (72 female, 87 male). Participants received a $10
show-up fee and had the opportunity to make up to an additional $5 based upon their
decisions in the experiment. On average, participants were 19.8 years old (SD = 2.42).
Design. We randomly assigned participants to one of two between-subject
emotion-induction conditions (Anxiety vs. Neutral). We induced emotions by showing
participants one of two film clips. Participants in the anxiety condition viewed a clip
from the movie Vertical Limit (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005). In this video clip, a
family climbs the face of a cliff and some of the climbers plummet to their death.
Participants in the neutral condition viewed a clip from Planet Earth. This video shows
fish swimming in an ocean, accompanied by calm, descriptive narration.
Pilot Study. We conducted a manipulation check of our video clip induction with
a non-overlapping sample of 64 participants who completed a series of studies in
exchange for $10. These participants watched one of the two video clips (Anxiety vs.
Neutral) and rated their emotions after watching the video. To measure anxiety, we
averaged responses for anxious, apprehensive, worried, and nervous (=.84). To
measure neutral feelings, we averaged responses for neutral, indifferent, unemotional,
and calm (=.95).
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After our manipulation, feelings of anxiety were significantly higher in the
anxiety condition than in the neutral condition, t(62) = 7.48, p < .001, and neutral
feelings were higher in the neutral condition than in the anxiety condition, t(62)=5.80,
p<.001. Importantly, other negatively-valenced emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, and
disgust) did not significantly differ across conditions.
Procedure. For each session, we recruited even-numbered groups of participants
(minimum group size was six participants) to the laboratory. We seated participants in
separate cubicles in front of computers with headphones. We presented all of the
instructions and experimental tasks on the computer screen. We told participants that
they would complete a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant (whose
behavior was in fact simulated by the computer). We tested their understanding of the
negotiation with a comprehension check. Participants who failed the comprehension
check twice were dismissed from the study (n = 8).
After completing the comprehension check, participants watched the video clip.
We explained this task to participants as a separate study about memory. After watching
the video, participants made their first offer in the negotiation.
Negotiation Task. Consistent with Study 1 and previous work, we used a threeissue cell-phone shipment negotiation (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al.,
2004). However, unlike Study 1, in Study 2 the counterpart was simulated by a preprogrammed set of computer responses. We informed participants that they would be
assigned to either the role of buyer or seller. After a brief pause during which the
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computer purportedly assigned roles to each participant, we assigned every participant to
the role of seller.
We did not provide participants with the buyer’s payoff table, but participants
understood that it differed from their own. We told participants that only those who
reached an agreement would earn additional money. We told participants that the seller
would make the first offer, the buyer would see the offer and make a counteroffer, and
the negotiation would continue until they reached an agreement or until time ran out. We
explained that there would be at least six rounds of offers and counteroffers, but that
they would not know the exact length of the negotiation. In fact, every negotiation ended
after the sixth round of offers (as in Van Kleef et al., 2004). After the instructions and a
comprehension check, sellers made their first offer.
First offers capture negotiator behavior immediately following the emotion
induction. We postulate (and demonstrate in Study 3) that the effects of our movie clip
induction dissipate quickly. In this study, participants knew the full range of possible
offers. Therefore, we conceptualize first offers as a form of concessionary behavior.
Results and Discussion
Supporting our prediction, participants in the anxiety condition made
significantly lower first offers (M =$11.77, SD =2.55) than did participants in the neutral
condition (M = $12.73, SD = 2.20), t(147) = 2.45, p = .015. This result is depicted in
Figure 4. We did not find significant differences across conditions in subsequent rounds
of the negotiation.
------------------------------------
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Insert Figure 4 about here
------------------------------------Participants in the anxiety condition made steeper initial concessions (i.e., lower
first offers) than did participants in the neutral condition. This finding supports our
prediction, and suggests that anxious negotiators are more eager than non-anxious
negotiators to escape negotiations. We test this hypothesis directly in Study 3.
Study 3
In Study 3, we shift our focus from negotiation to bargaining situations.
Bargaining situations are abstracted versions of negotiations, and behavior in bargaining
situations enables scholars to study behaviors that have important implications for both
bargaining and negotiations. In this study, we examine the influence of anxiety on
deliberate exit decisions in a bargaining game. Consistent with our thesis, we expect
anxious individuals to exit bargaining situations earlier than individuals who are not
anxious.
We study exit decisions in a modified version of the shrinking pie game. A
substantial literature has studied bargaining behavior with shrinking pie games (e.g.,
Rubinstein, 1982; Weg, Rapoport & Felsenthal, 1990), including the shortest version of
the shrinking pie game, the ultimatum game (e.g., Bolton & Zwick, 1995; Solnick &
Schweitzer, 1999). In this study, we introduce a new variation of the shrinking pie game
to study exit decisions in a bargaining context.
Method
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Participants. One hundred seventy-nine students at a Northeastern university
participated in the study for a $10 show-up fee and the opportunity to make up to an
additional $23 based upon their decisions and the decisions of others in the experiment
(92 female, 87 male). On average, participants were 20.1 years old (SD = 1.89).
Design/Procedure. In this study, there were two within-subjects conditions
(Anxiety v. Neutral). Participants read instructions, completed a comprehension check,
watched the first video clip, completed the first bargaining task, watched a second video
clip, and then completed a second bargaining task with a new partner. The order in
which the video clips were presented was counterbalanced between subjects.
Bargaining Task. We developed a continuous version of the shrinking pie game
(Rubinstein, 1982; Weg, Rapoport & Felsenthal, 1990). The original version of the
shrinking pie game involves two players who make sequential moves to decide how to
divide a “pie” or sum of money. In the first round, the first player proposes a division of
the pie. The second player can either accept or reject this proposed split. If the second
player rejects the proposed division, the pie shrinks, and the second player proposes a
division of the reduced pie. The first player can then either accept or reject the new
proposal. If the first player rejects the proposed division, the pie shrinks again, and the
first player proposes another division of the reduced pie. This procedure continues until
one of the parties accepts a proposed division or the game ends with an imposed payoff
(e.g., $0, $0). This bargaining game has been called the “shrinking pie” game because
the size of the sum of money shrinks at each stage of the game (Rubinstein, 1982).
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The shrinking-pie game is very similar to the ultimatum game, which has been
extensively studied to investigate bargaining behavior. In fact, the one-round version of
the shrinking-pie game is equivalent to the ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game, the
first player proposes a division of the pie, the second player either accepts or rejects the
proposed division, and the game ends. Studies involving the ultimatum game have
examined a number of negotiation-relevant topics, including fairness, deception,
emotion, and even physical attractiveness (Blount & Larrick, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999).
Like the ultimatum game, the shrinking-pie game measures an important aspect
of bargaining and negotiation behavior: the decision to exit. The shrinking pie game is
particularly well-suited for our investigation because it involves a relatively short
interaction that follows an emotion induction. In this study, we used a movie-clip
induction that may dissipate before the end of a lengthy or involved negotiation.
We develop a modified version of the shrinking-pie game. In our version, two
players make simultaneous decisions to stay or to exit the bargaining game as the pie
shrinks continuously over time. In our experiment, the pie starts at $30 and decreases by
fifty cents every second (until the pie equals $0 after 60 seconds). Participants can stop
the clock by choosing to exit any time during the 60 seconds.
The first player to exit stops the clock and determines the size of the pie. The
first player to exit earns 25% of the pie and the second player to exit earns 75% of the
pie. In this game, players choose exit decisions to balance two competing concerns;
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early exit ensures a large pie size, but increases the likelihood of claiming a small share
of the pie.
In this experiment, participants learned that they would be matched with another
participant in the session to complete a computer-mediated bargaining task. We
presented each participant with the payoff information depicted in Figure 5, an
animation of how the pie decreases over time. We informed participants that their
counterpart would see the same figure. We also told participants that if both participants
waited until the end to exit, they would both earn $0.
We informed participants that they would make their decisions simultaneously
and independently; participants would not know when their counterpart decided to exit
until after they had made their own decision. We also informed participants that they
would make two rounds of decisions with a different counterpart each time. Finally, we
informed participants that we would pay them based on one randomly selected round’s
outcome.
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here
------------------------------------Results and Discussion
Supporting our prediction, participants in the Anxiety condition exited the
bargaining situation earlier (M = 19.20 seconds, SD = 15.17) than did participants in the
Neutral condition (M = 24.79 seconds, SD = 17.60). In a one-way repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) within subjects, we found that this relationship was
significant, F(1, 177) = 38.21, p < .0001. We depict this effect in Figure 6. We found no
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order effects for the sequence in which we presented the video clips (anxiety clip first v.
neutral clip first).
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 6 about here
------------------------------------Results from Study 3 demonstrate that anxiety causes individuals to exit early.
We believe that the decision to exit in this bargaining context is indicative of exit
tendencies more broadly.
Study 4
In Study 4, we consider an important moderator of the influence of anxiety on
exit behavior. Prior research has found that people tend to believe that they are below
average in performing difficult skill-based tasks, such as negotiating (Moore & Cain,
2007). Other work, however, has found that negotiators with high self-efficacy may feel
confident in their negotiating ability and insulate themselves from the prospect of
negative outcomes. Negotiator self-efficacy is the belief in one’s ability to perform well
in a negotiation (Bandura, 1993; Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2006).
We postulate that individuals with high negotiator self-efficacy are less affected
by anxiety than are negotiators with average negotiator self-efficacy. Specifically, we
expect negotiators with high self-efficacy to persist in difficult negotiations, and we
predict that anxiety influences negotiators with high self-efficacy less than it influences
negotiators with moderate self-efficacy. In Study 4, we consider the role of negotiator
self-efficacy in moderating the relationship between anxiety and early exit.
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Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-nine students at a Northeastern university
participated in the study for a $10 show-up fee and the opportunity to earn up to an
additional $23. On average, participants were 20.3 years old (SD = 2.01).
Design. We randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions in a 2
(Anxiety v. Neutral) x 2 (High self-efficacy v. Average self-efficacy) design. We
manipulated emotion (Anxiety v. Neutral) as we did in Studies 2 and 3 with video clips.
We manipulated negotiator self-efficacy by providing false performance
feedback (High self-efficacy v. Average self-efficacy) on a “Negotiation Aptitude Test.”
For this study, we developed the Negotiation Aptitude Test by creating ten questions to
purportedly assess negotiation ability. We include the full Negotiation Aptitude Test in
the Appendix. We introduced the aptitude test with the following text:
Negotiations often involve balance. For example, some people are too aggressive
and some are too passive. Some people focus too much on relationships and
some focus too much on their own interests. Though there are often no perfect
answers, the Negotiation Aptitude Test (N.A.T.) has been validated on a large
U.S. based sample. For example, N.A.T. scores have been linked to a number of
real-world outcomes such as starting salaries, home sale prices, and auto
purchases.
Following the introduction, participants answered 10 questions, such as the following:
Imagine that you want to purchase a house that has a list price of $500,000, but
comparable prices for homes range from $350,000 to $450,000. You can afford
to pay $400,000. The housing market is rising (house prices are increasing), and
there are three other buyers interested in the same house. Of the following
options, which is best?
a. Wait for another buyer to make an initial offer.
b. Offer $400K before the other buyers make offers.
c. Offer $350K before the other buyers make offers.
d. Look for a different house that has fewer interested buyers.
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After participants completed the Negotiation Aptitude Test, we provided them
with false performance feedback. In the High self-efficacy condition, we informed
participants that they had scored in the 96th percentile. In the Average self-efficacy
condition, we informed participants that they had scored in the 47th percentile.
Pilot Study. To assess the effectiveness of the self-efficacy induction, we
conducted a manipulation check with a non-overlapping sample of 107 participants who
completed the Negotiation Aptitude Test as part of a series of studies they completed in
exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions (High self-efficacy
v. Average self-efficacy). Participants completed the Negotiation Aptitude Test,
received false performance feedback, and then completed a ten-item measure of
negotiator self-efficacy (Sullivan, B., O’Connor, K., & Burris, E., 2005). The ten items
included statements such as “I am certain that I can persuade the other negotiator to
make most of the concessions” and “I feel confident in my ability to negotiate
effectively” (rated on a 5-point scale).
We compared negotiator self-efficacy across conditions. After our manipulation,
participants’ mean level of negotiator self-efficacy was significantly higher in the High
condition (M = 3.60, SD =.53) than in the Average condition (M = 3.18, SD =.55),
t(105) = 4.02, p < .001.
Procedure. First, participants completed the Negotiation Aptitude Test and
received false performance feedback. Second, participants read the instructions for the
continuous shrinking-pie bargaining task (as in Study 3) and completed a
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comprehension check. Next, participants watched one of two emotion-inducing video
clips, and then made exit decisions in the continuous shrinking-pie bargaining task.
Results and Discussion
We found that self-efficacy moderates the influence of anxiety on exit decisions.
We conducted a 2 (Anxiety v. Neutral) x 2 (High self-efficacy v. Average self-efficacy)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on exit decisions. We found two significant main effects
and a significant interaction. As before, participants in the anxiety condition exited
earlier than did participants in the neutral condition, F(1, 155) = 4.01, p = .047. In
addition, participants in the low self-efficacy condition exited earlier than did
participants in the high self-efficacy condition, F(1, 155) = 14.83, p = .0002.
Interestingly, we found a significant interaction between anxiety and self-efficacy, F(1,
155) = 4.29, p = .04. Participants in the Average self-efficacy condition exhibit the same
pattern of results we found in Study 3. However, participant in the High self-efficacy
condition were not influenced by anxiety. We depict this pattern of results in Figure 7.
----------------------------------Insert Figure 7 about here
----------------------------------General Discussion
For many people, the prospect of negotiating induces anxiety. In fact, anxiety
may be the most pervasive negotiator emotion. We demonstrate that anxiety
significantly harms negotiator behavior. Compared to negotiators in a neutral emotional
state, anxious negotiators lower their expectations, make lower first offers, respond to
counteroffers more quickly, and exit negotiations earlier—behaviors that are not
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explained by other negatively-valenced emotions. In our studies, these behaviors caused
anxious negotiators to attain worse outcomes. We also found that negotiator selfefficacy moderates the effects of anxiety on exit behavior. Individuals with high
negotiator self-efficacy are less affected by the harmful effects of anxiety.
In our studies, we induced incidental anxiety. This approach afforded us
experimental control; every participant experienced the same stimuli, and there were no
normative reasons for incidental anxiety to influence negotiation behavior. As a result,
our studies offer a conservative test of the influence of anxiety on negotiations. In
addition to experiencing incidental anxiety, negotiators are likely to experience directed
anxiety. The prospect of a difficult negotiation, high stakes, or an abrasive counterpart
can trigger anxiety. Future work should investigate different triggers and the effects of
directed anxiety on negotiator behavior.
Our findings establish an important link between anxiety and self-efficacy.
Future work remains, however, with respect to understanding negotiator self-efficacy
itself. Prior research has measured negotiator self-efficacy and linked self-efficacy with
tactics and outcomes (Sullivan, O’Connor, & Burris, 2005), but no prior work has
induced negotiator self-efficacy. In this paper, we introduce a tool for inducing
negotiator self-efficacy (see Appendix), and we find that negotiator self-efficacy is both
labile and consequential. In Study 4, participants who received false performance
feedback indicating that they were effective negotiators were more tenacious and made
later exit decisions than did negotiators who received false performance feedback
indicating that they were average negotiators.
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Prescriptively, our findings suggest that negotiators may improve their
performance by curtailing their experience of anxiety and by boosting their perceptions
of negotiation self-efficacy. For example, negotiation courses as well as negotiation
simulations and training more generally may reduce anxiety and improve negotiator
performance by boosting negotiator self-efficacy and by making negotiation situations
routine (i.e., less novel) and hence less anxiety provoking. Future work should study
these relationships and even consider the broader implication that self-affirmation in
general may boost generalized self-efficacy and improve negotiation performance.
Another possible prescription for curtailing the influence of anxiety is to
heighten self-awareness of anxiety. Prior work has found that making people aware of
their emotional state enables people to correct for the influence of emotions on their
judgment (Schwartz, 1990). Perhaps acknowledging feelings of anxiety could serve as a
coping mechanism.
Our findings demonstrate that anxiety promotes flight behavior in negotiation.
Future work should consider different types of flight. For example, there may be
qualitative differences between volitional exit (i.e., deciding to leave prematurely) and
an accelerated process (i.e., faster response times). In negotiations, volitional exit may
yield impasses, whereas an accelerated process may yield poor agreements. In some
cases, incentives may counteract the detrimental effects of anxiety on exit behavior.
Quite possibly, even anxious individuals may be persuaded to persist until they reach
specific goals, and future work should explore the interplay between incentives and
different types of exit. For example, in Study 1, the expected value of exit was much
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lower than the expected value of reaching an agreement. In this case, few negotiators
exited with an impasse. Instead, anxious negotiators accelerated their process by
lowering expectations, responding more quickly to counteroffers, and making steeper
concessions.
Quite possibly, a strategic negotiator could induce anxiety in a counterpart to
extract concessions. Even non-strategic negotiators may induce anxiety in a counterpart,
either accidentally or via contagion. Prior work has found that emotions are easily
transmitted across individuals (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, Rapson, 1994),
and we conjecture that anxiety is highly contagious. Future work should explore issues
such as how people perceive anxiety in others and how anxiety spreads between team
members and negotiators.
A number of individual differences may moderate the relationship between
anxiety and negotiator behavior. For example, risk attitude impacts negotiator behavior
(Bottom, 1998), and differences in risk attitudes may influence the amount of anxiety
negotiators experience in uncertain environments. Neuroticism may also matter.
Neuroticism is a personality trait associated with the tendency to arouse quickly, to
inhibit slowly, and to appraise events as stressful (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Individuals
high in neuroticism may be particularly susceptible to anxiety triggers and the influence
of anxiety in negotiation.
We identify an important link between the anxiety individuals experience and
negotiation behavior. The association between anxiety and negotiations we measured in
our pilot survey, however, was expected anxiety. Though prior work has found that
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people sometimes mispredict their affective experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002), we
postulate that the experience of anxiety is a fundamental aspect of many negotiations
that merits additional research. For example, future work should study how different
aspects of negotiations induce anxiety, how the magnitude of anxiety may change
behavior, how anxiety influences information exchange, how anxiety influences
negotiator satisfaction, how anxiety influences decisions to enter negotiations, and how
anxiety influences patterns of concession.
In addition to describing the importance of anxiety as an anticipatory emotion,
our findings highlight the importance of excitement in negotiations. Future work should
focus on the influence of excitement in negotiations and explore the interplay between
anxiety, excitement, and physiological arousal. Some individuals may conceptualize a
negotiation as an anxiety-inducing threat, while others may conceptualize the same
situation as an exciting challenge. Similarly, though we did not detect significant gender
differences in our studies, it is possible that men and women may perceive the same
opportunities to negotiate quite differently (see Small et al., 2007).
Our findings also relate to the literature on alcohol in negotiations. Many
negotiators consume alcohol prior to or during negotiations (Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000).
Alcohol consumption directly influences negotiator behavior (Schweitzer & Gomberg,
2001), and future work should explore the role of anxiety in both motivating negotiators
to consume alcohol as well as alcohol moderating the relationship between anxiety and
negotiator behavior.

39
Finally, although our studies focused on the harmful effects of anxiety, it is
possible that mild amounts of anxiety might actually improve negotiator performance.
The magnitude of anxiety may have profound effects on behavior. For example, the
Yerkes-Dodson Effect suggests a curvilinear relationship between arousal (i.e., stress)
and performance. Though very low or very high levels of arousal may be debilitating, a
moderate level of arousal may improve performance on difficult tasks like attention,
memory, and problem-solving (e.g., Anderson, Revelle, Lynch, 1989; Lupien et al.,
2007; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Perhaps moderate amounts of anxiety can increase
focus or trigger defensive pessimism (Norem & Chang, 2002). As a result, some
anticipatory anxiety may cause negotiators to prepare more thoroughly. Ultimately,
though we identify harmful effects of anxiety for negotiators, mild amounts of anxiety
may actually help Nervous Nelly negotiate.
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Appendix
Negotiation Aptitude Test (to manipulate negotiator self-efficacy)
1. Imagine that you want to purchase a house that has a list price of $500,000, but
comparable prices for homes range from $350,000 to $450,000. You can afford to pay
$400,000. The housing market is rising (house prices are increasing), and there are three
other buyers interested in the same house. Of the following options, which is best?
a. Wait for another buyer to make an initial offer.
b. Offer $400,000 before the other buyers make offers.
c. Offer $350,000 before the other buyers make offers.
d. Look for a different house that has fewer interested buyers.
2. Imagine that you want to buy a house that has a list price of $200,000, but comparable
prices for homes range from $150,000 to $250,000. You can afford to pay $300,000.
The housing market is falling (house prices are decreasing), and there are three other
buyers interested in the same house. Of the following options, which is best?
a. Wait for another buyer to make an initial offer.
b. Make a full-price offer of $200,000 before the other buyers make offers.
c. Offer $150,000 before the other buyers make offers.
d. Look for a different house that has fewer interested buyers.
3. Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of
$70,000/year. New hires with similar experience, education, and skills are paid
$75,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the job
market, and the unemployment rate is 10% (very high). You have no other outside
options. Of the following choices, which is best?
a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $80,000/year.
b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $75,000/year.
c. Accept the offer at $70,000/year.
d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.
4. Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of
$70,000/year. New hires with similar experience, background, education, and skills are
paid $75,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the
job market, and the unemployment rate is 1% (very low). You have no other outside
options. Of the following choices, which is best?
a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $80,000/year.
b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $75,000/year.
c. Accept the offer at $70,000/year.
d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.
5. Imagine that you are buying a new car. You have found the exact car that you want,
and the dealer has it in stock. The list price is $35,000, and from your research the dealer

49
invoice is $28,000. You really like this car, and you would be willing to pay up to
$35,000 for it. You suspect that other buyers are interested in this same car and that the
dealership is not very eager to sell this car. What amount would you make for your first
offer?
a. $28K
b. $30K
c. $33K
d. Make the dealership offer the next price.
6. Imagine that you are buying a new car. You have found the exact car that you want,
and the dealer has it in stock. The list price is $35,000, and from your research the dealer
invoice is $28,000. You really like this car, and you would be willing to pay up to
$35,000 for it. You suspect that other buyers are not interested in this same car and that
the dealership is very eager to sell this car. What amount would you make for your first
offer?
a. $28K
b. $30K
c. $33K
d. Make the dealership offer the next price.
7. Imagine that you are organizing a large party. You are working with a caterer for a sitdown dinner for 200 people. The caterer is charging you $100 per person and asks you
to commit to the exact number of guests. This caterer is the best in town. You can pay
$20,000, but you would prefer to pay less. How would you respond to this caterer?
a. Pay full price to ensure good service.
b. Offer the caterer $80 per person and commit to 200 people.
c. Offer the caterer $100 per person, but insist on paying for only the guests who
show up.
d. Shop for alternative caterers to use as competitive leverage.
8. Imagine that you are organizing a large party. You are working with a caterer for a sitdown dinner for 200 people. The caterer is charging you $100 per person and asks you
to commit to the exact number of guests. This caterer is NOT the best in town. You can
pay $20,000, but you would prefer to pay less. How would you respond to this caterer?
a. Pay full price to ensure good service.
b. Offer the caterer $80 per person and commit to 200 people.
c. Offer the caterer $100 per person, but insist on paying for only the guests who
show up.
d. Shop for alternative caterers to use as competitive leverage.
9. Imagine you are getting married to the man or woman of your dreams. Your fiancé
wants you to sign a prenuptial agreement before you wed because s/he is fairly wealthy.
In the case of divorce, the prenuptial offer is to split your wealth and assets 80% for your
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spouse, 20% for you because that is the ratio of your current wealth. What should you
do?
a. Agree to sign the prenuptial agreement with the 80/20 division.
b. Agree to sign the prenuptial agreement only with a 50/50 division of wealth
and assets to be equitable.
c. Consult with a lawyer and then make a counter-offer.
d. Refuse to sign the prenuptial agreement because marriage is about love, not
material wealth.
10. To what extent are the following statements true?
a. Almost always true

b. Often true

c. Rarely true

-In general, it is better to live with some conflict.
-Not all conflict needs to be managed.
-In reality, most things in life are negotiable.
-Many people are willing to provide the same goods or services for a lower price.
-If you offer someone a low price, they are likely to provide worse service or get
insulted.
-When people say that a price is their absolute lowest price, they are telling the truth.
-Once people have their mind set on a certain deal, you cannot change their mind.
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Tables
Table 1.
Mean emotion ratings during music manipulation check (Study 1).

Anxious Music

Mean
SD

Neutral Music

Mean
SD

Happy

Sad

1.94

1.18

2.17

1.85

1.27

(0.37)

(0.46)

(0.81)

(1.07)

(1.12)

2.02

1.24

1.16

3.47

1.07

(0.82)

(0.71)

(0.29)

(1.16)

(0.53)

Note: Ratings were on a 5-point scale

Anxious Neutral

Angry
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Table 2.
Buyer Payoff Chart (Study 1).
Price of Phones

Warranty Period

Service Contract

Price

Payoff

Warranty

Payoff

Service

$150
$145
$140
$135
$130
$125
$120
$115
$110

$0.00
$1.00
$2.00
$3.00
$4.00
$5.00
$6.00
$7.00
$8.00

1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months

$0.00
$0.60
$1.20
$1.80
$2.40
$3.00
$3.60
$4.20
$4.80

1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months

Payoff
$0.00
$0.30
$0.60
$0.90
$1.20
$1.50
$1.80
$2.10
$2.40

Seller Payoff Chart (Studies 1-4).
Price of Phones

Warranty Period

Service Contract

Price

Payoff

Warranty

Payoff

Service

$150
$145
$140
$135
$130
$125
$120
$115
$110

$8.00
$7.00
$6.00
$5.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00

1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months

$2.40
$2.10
$1.80
$1.50
$1.20
$ .90
$ .60
$ .30
$0.00

1 month
2 months
3 months
4 months
5 months
6 months
7 months
8 months
9 months

Payoff
$4.80
$4.20
$3.60
$3.00
$2.40
$1.80
$1.20
$ .60
$0.00
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Table 3.
Mean Negotiated Outcomes (Study 1).

Buyer Emotion

Seller Emotion

Buyer Profit

Seller Profit

Dyadic Profit

# of
Dyads

Anxious

Anxious

$7.52 ($1.56)

$7.35 ($1.88)

$14.87

18

Neutral

Anxious

$8.18 ($1.47)

$6.99 ($2.04)

$15.17

14

Anxious

Neutral

$6.60 ($2.09)

$8.38 ($2.23)

$14.98

20

Neutral

Neutral

$7.94 ($1.67)

$7.81 ($1.06)

$15.75

15

Note: Possible individual profit [$0, $15.20]. Possible dyadic profit [$12.80, $17.60].
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Figures

Figure 1. Emotion ratings before negotiating for a higher salary (Pilot Survey)
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Figure 2. Emotion ratings before negotiating over the price of a car (Pilot Survey)
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Figure 3. The effect of anxiety on aspirations, expectations, and first offers (Study 1)

$14

Mean Value (USD)

$12

$11.93
$11.55

$10
$8.31
$8

$9.55
$8.36

$6.95

Anxiety
Neutral

$6
$4
$2
$0
Aspirations

Expectations

First Offers

57
Figure 4. The effect of anxiety on first offers (Study 2)
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Figure 5. Continuous shrinking-pie bargaining task payoff function (Studies 3-4)

Note: This is a screen-shot of the payoff animation displayed to participants
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Figure 6. The effect of anxiety on exit decisions (Study 3)
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Figure 7. The effects of anxiety and negotiator self-efficacy on exit decisions (Study 4)
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CHAPTER 2.
ANXIETY, ADVICE, AND THE ABILITY TO DISCERN:
FEELING ANXIOUS MOTIVATES INDIVIDUALS TO SEEK AND USE ADVICE

Francesca Gino
Alison Wood Brooks
Maurice E. Schweitzer

Published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on November 28th, 2011.

ABSTRACT
Across eight experiments, we describe the influence of anxiety on advice seeking and
advice taking. We find that anxious individuals are more likely to seek and rely on
advice than are those in a neutral emotional state (Experiment 1), but this pattern of
results does not generalize to other negatively-valenced emotions (Experiment 2). The
relationships between anxiety and advice seeking and anxiety and advice taking are
mediated by self-confidence; anxiety lowers self-confidence, which increases advice
seeking and reliance upon advice (Experiment 3). Though anxiety also impairs
information processing, impaired information processing does not mediate the
relationship between anxiety and advice taking (Experiment 4). Finally, we find that
anxious individuals fail to discriminate between good and bad advice (Experiment 5a-c),
and between advice from advisors with and without a conflict of interest (Experiment 6).
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ANXIETY, ADVICE, AND THE ABILITY TO DISCERN:
FEELING ANXIOUS MOTIVATES INDIVIDUALS TO SEEK AND USE ADVICE
When individuals face important decisions, such as how to invest savings or how
to choose a course of medical treatment, they often feel anxious and seek advice from
colleagues, friends, and experts. Anxiety is “a state of distress and/or physiological
arousal in reaction to stimuli including novel situations and the potential for undesirable
outcomes” (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 44). Prior research has documented harmful
effects of anxiety on decision making. For example, anxiety impairs the ability to
process information (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Ganzer, 1968; Sengupta & Johar, 2001; Zatz
& Chassin, 1985).
In addition to experiencing anxiety, when making important decisions, people
frequently seek advice from colleagues, friends, and experts. Drawing on previous
research on the role of anxiety in decision making, we investigate how anxiety
influences advice seeking and advice taking. Departing from previous work, we propose
that anxiety harms individuals’ confidence in their ability to make good decisions. As a
result, individuals with impaired self-confidence are motivated to seek advice from
others and rely on it, even when the advice they receive is bad. This line of research
advances our understanding of how anxiety influences decision making by considering
the motivational, in addition to the cognitive, consequences of experiencing anxiety.
Advice
We define advice as any relevant ideas and judgments that are offered to a
decision maker. Our definition of advice includes contexts in which advisors are
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disinterested in the advisee’s decision and outcome as well as contexts in which advisors
are invested in the advisee’s decision and outcome, as in the case of helping behavior
and persuasion.
In general, the process of seeking and receiving advice from others can expose
an advisee to a conflict between their initial judgment and the advice they receive
(Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). For example, a homebuyer may plan to make an offer of
$400,000 to a seller. Before the buyer makes an offer, however, she may consult her
realtor, who may advise her to offer $440,000 to avoid insulting the seller. Although
little prior research has explored the advice-seeking process, a growing literature has
investigated advice taking. This work identifies three factors that influence how
receptive individuals are to advice.
First, characteristics of the advisor matter. Individuals weight advice more
heavily when advisors are more experienced or more knowledgeable than the decision
makers themselves (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Harvey &
Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger,
2000; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007). People are similarly more likely to weight advice
when advisors express confidence in the quality of their advice (Sniezek & Buckley,
1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, in press; Van Swol & Sniezek,
2005; Yaniv, 1997).
Second, characteristics of the decision task moderate how receptive individuals
are to advice. For example, individuals weigh advice more heavily when the task is
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difficult than when it is easy (Gino & Moore, 2007) and when advice is costly to obtain
than when it is free (Gino, 2008; Patt, Bowles, & Cash, 2006).
Third, aspects of the decision maker’s internal state impact how receptive
individuals are to advice, such as the decision maker’s confidence (Cooper, 1991) and
emotional state (e.g., Gino & Schweitzer, 2008).
The extant advice-taking literature has also identified a surprising regularity: in
almost every domain, individuals discount the advice they receive (see Bonaccio &
Dalal, 2006 for a review). In contrast to this finding, we identify an important aspect of a
decision maker’s internal state that causes individuals to be very receptive to advice:
anxiety. We postulate that anxiety promotes feelings of low self-confidence. Compared
to individuals in a neutral emotional state, we expect anxious individuals to lack
confidence in their ability to make good judgments. As a result, we predict that anxious
individuals will become more likely to seek advice and to rely on the advice they
receive, even when the advice is bad.
Anxiety
Anxiety is triggered by uncertain and novel situations that have the potential for
adverse consequences (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). For example, an inexperienced
homebuyer who is concerned about losing the opportunity to buy a desirable home may
feel anxious when making an offer. Anxiety is a common emotion that signals the
presence of a potential threat, promotes pessimistic appraisals of future events, and
triggers psychological responses that help individuals reduce their vulnerability (Barlow,
1988; Butler & Mathews, 1983, 1987; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Savitsky, Medvec,
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Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998; Shepperd, Grace, Cole, & Klein, 2005; Young, Klap, Shoai,
& Wells, 2008). Extant anxiety research has largely focused on trait anxiety (e.g.,
Endler, 1980; Eysenck, 1982, 1992, 1997; Kantor, Endler, Heslegrave, & Kocovski,
2001; Stober, 1997), a personality characteristic similar to neuroticism that reflects an
individual’s susceptibility to anxious feelings (Spielberger, 1985). Individuals with high
trait anxiety and those with anxiety disorders experience anxious feelings frequently.
In this paper we focus on state anxiety, a transient emotion that anyone can
experience. Unlike trait anxiety, state anxiety is relatively short-lived, often occurring
for mere seconds or minutes. Consistent with prior research (see Brooks & Schweitzer,
2011; Gray, 1991), we conceptualize anxiety to subsume fear, tension, worry,
nervousness, stress, and apprehension. Anxiety is an unpleasant and aversive emotion
(Marks & Nesse, 1994) that is characterized by high activation (within Russell’s [1980]
affective circumplex model), high uncertainty, and low control (within Smith and
Ellsworth’s [1985] appraisal framework).
State anxiety can be directed or incidental. In contrast to directed emotions that
are triggered by an aspect of the decision context itself (e.g., by the nature of the
decision or the people involved), incidental emotions are triggered by a prior stimulus
that is unrelated to the current decision (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001). For example, an
individual who plans to invest in the stock market might experience directed anxiety
because he is worried about losing money in the market, incidental anxiety because he
watched an anxiety-inducing movie before making an investment decision, or both. In
this paper, we study incidental anxiety because it offers a conservative test of the
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influence of anxiety on advice taking. There are no normative reasons for why incidental
anxiety should influence behavior.
Anxiety, Advice Seeking, and Advice Taking
Schwartz and Clore’s (1983) affect-as-information model suggests that
individuals rely on the characteristics of their feelings to inform their judgments and
decisions (1988; Pham, 1998; Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 1998; Frijda, 1986;
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Schwartz, 1990). When feeling anxious, individuals feel
both high uncertainty and low control. These feelings erode self-confidence (Maddux,
1995; Schunk, 1995), harm self-efficacy, the belief that one is capable of attaining a
specific, desirable goal (Bandura, 1977, 1997; Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 1984;
Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990; Martin & Gil, 1991), and consequently
promote advice seeking and advice taking.
When individuals feel high uncertainty, they are likely to adopt an implicit goal
of reducing uncertainty (e.g., Fridja, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Izard, 1977;
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006). We expect
individuals to seek and rely upon the advice of others as a direct consequence of feeling
uncertain.
In prior work, feelings of confidence moderate how receptive individuals are to
advice. As individuals become more confident, they become less receptive to advice
(e.g., Gino & Moore, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000;
Yaniv, 2004). By eroding self-confidence, we expect that anxiety promotes advice

67
seeking and advice taking. Specifically, we predict that self-confidence will mediate the
relationships between anxiety and advice seeking and anxiety and advice taking.
Anxiety may also promote advice taking by increasing the need for social
affiliation. A healthy social network can improve an individual’s physical and mental
ability to cope with anxiety (Schachter, 1959; Taylor, 2006; Taylor, 2000; Zadro,
Williams, & Richardson, 2004). As a result, we expect anxious individuals to be
particularly likely to seek and rely upon the advice of others.
Anxiety and the Ability to Discriminate Between Good and Bad Advice
Individuals are generally sensitive to the quality of the advice they receive.
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) found that individuals are more receptive to good advice
than they are to bad advice. We expect anxious individuals, however, to be less
discerning than neutral individuals. Anxiety harms self-confidence. Low confidence
causes individuals to place low weight on their own estimates and to create a wide
confidence interval around their own judgments. With a wide confidence interval,
individuals will consider a large set of values or ideas to be reasonable. As a result,
anxious individuals are more likely than neutral individuals to consider bad advice to be
reasonable or acceptable.
For similar reasons, we expect anxious individuals, compared to non-anxious
individuals, to rely more heavily on advice from advisors with a conflict of interest.
Conflicted advisors often allow their personal preferences to influence the advice they
offer others (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). In general, advisees, even when they
are aware of the conflict of interest, rely heavily on the advice they receive (Cain,
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Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). By eroding confidence, we expect anxiety to exacerbate
this problem. Specifically, by eroding self-confidence, we expect anxiety to cause
individuals to consider a wide range of advice values as reasonable. As a result, anxious
individuals are likely to consider even biased advice from a conflicted advisor as
reasonable. Low confidence also causes anxious advisees to place low weight on their
own estimates relative to the weight they place on the advice of others. Taken together,
we predict that anxious individuals will rely more heavily on advice from an advisor
with a conflict of interest than non-anxious individuals.
Importantly, we do not develop specific hypotheses with respect to anxiety and
accuracy. The influence of anxiety on accuracy is likely to be moderated by a number of
factors, such as the accuracy of an individual’s initial judgments, the accuracy of advice,
and an individual’s initial receptivity to advice. For example, if an anxious individual
makes an accurate initial judgment and receives bad advice, his final judgment may be
less accurate than his initial judgment. On the other hand, if his initial judgment was
inaccurate and he receives very good advice, his final judgment is likely to become more
accurate.
Overview of the Present Research
Compared to individuals in a neutral state, we expect anxious individuals to be
more likely to seek advice and to use advice, even if the advice is of low quality. We
expect the relationship between anxiety and receptivity to advice to be mediated by low
self-confidence. We depict our theoretical model in Figure 1.
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We test our hypotheses in eight experiments. In Experiment 1, we induce
incidental anxiety and measure how likely participants are to seek and take advice from
others. In Experiment 2, we compare the effects of incidental anger to those of incidental
anxiety and demonstrate that these two emotions, though both negatively valenced,
affect advice taking differently. Compared to a control condition, anger decreases advice
taking and anxiety increases it. In Experiment 3, we show that anxiety lowers selfconfidence, which, in turn, promotes advice taking. In Experiment 4, we disentangle
cognitive from motivational mechanisms to explain the link between anxiety and advice
taking. We show that low self-confidence mediates the relationship between anxiety and
advice taking, but impaired information processing does not. In Experiments 5a-c, we
examine whether anxiety harms the ability to discriminate between good and bad advice.
In Experiment 6, we examine whether anxiety harms the ability to discriminate between
advice from advisors with or without a conflict of interest. Across our studies, we use
different emotion inductions to trigger anxiety (e.g., movie clips, audio clips, and
writing tasks) and different decision tasks.
Our work makes several theoretical contributions. First, we extend our
understanding of the influence of state anxiety on self-confidence and subsequent
decision making. Previous research has examined the cognitive consequences of
experiencing anxiety; here, we investigate its motivational consequences. Second, we
expand our understanding of the advice taking process (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal 2006;
Larrick & Soll, 2006). In particular, we identify the importance of self-confidence and
the ability to discern between good and bad advice. Third, though a growing literature
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has examined advice taking, our work examines the relatively understudied process of
advice seeking. Fourth, our work extends our understanding of how specific emotions
influence decision making in interpersonal settings (e.g., Ashfort & Humphrey, 1995;
Brief & Weiss, 2002).
Experiment 1: The Effect of Anxiety on Advice Seeking and Advice Taking
In Experiment 1, we examine how anxiety influences advice seeking and advice
taking. We also explore the role of self-confidence as a mediator.
Method
Participants
One hundred and two college students (56 female, Mage=21, SD=1.34) at a university in
the Southern United States participated in the study for pay. Participants received a $2
show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn an additional $6 during the study.
Design and Procedure
Participants sat in private computer cubicles and were randomly assigned to one
of two emotion conditions (anxiety vs. neutral). To mitigate potential demand effects,
we informed participants that the experiment included two unrelated studies, a “Weight
Estimation Study” (two parts) and a “Vivid Recall Study.” All of the study materials
were presented on the computer screen.
Initial estimates. In the experiment, we referred to this segment of the study as
the “Weight Estimation Study (Part 1).” Participants completed a repeated judgment
task. In each of three rounds, we showed participants a photo of a stranger and asked
them to estimate the person’s weight. As an incentive to be accurate, we gave
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participants a $1 bonus if their estimate fell within ten pounds of the actual weight of the
person in the photo.
Emotion induction. We referred to this segment of the experiment as the “Vivid
Recall Study.” Participants were told that they would be watching a video clip and that
they would be asked to recall details from the video clip later in the study. In this
segment of the experiment, we randomly assigned participants to watch either an
anxiety-inducing clip from the movie Vertical Limit about a mountain-climbing accident
or a neutral clip from a National Geographic documentary about fish in the Great
Barrier Reef. Both video clips have been used in prior emotion research to induce
anxiety and neutral feelings (e.g., Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Frederickson &
Branigan, 2005; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Gross & Levenson, 1995).
Measure of self-confidence. In the segment of the experiment after the emotion
induction, participants completed a four-item self-confidence measure (adapted from
Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). This measure included items such as “I feel capable”
and “I usually make good judgments” (=.96).
Revised estimates. After viewing the video clip and answering questions related
to self-confidence, participants made a second round of estimates. We referred to this
part of the experiment as the “Weight Estimation Study, Part 2.” We asked participants
to re-estimate the weight of the same three people they saw in Part 1, and told them they
would receive a $1 bonus every time their estimate fell within ten pounds of the actual
weight of the person in the photograph. Before showing participants the three
photographs, we asked them to indicate whether they wanted to receive advice from
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another participant. Participants answered this question only once prior to making their
estimates. If they chose to receive advice, we showed them the estimates that another
participant had purportedly made for the same set of photos in addition to their own
initial estimates. If they did not choose to receive advice, participants only saw their own
initial estimates. For experimental control, we kept the three advice values constant
across conditions. We explained that these values had been randomly chosen from
estimates participants in a previous study had made when they were assigned to the role
of advisor and were paid based upon the accuracy of their estimates. In each round, the
advice was of good quality since it fell within 5% of the true weight of the person in
each photo.
Emotion measures. Next, we asked participants to think back to the video clip
and to indicate the extent to which they felt various emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001;
Lerner et al., 2004).
Dependent Measures
Advice seeking. To assess advice seeking, we examined whether or not
participants chose to receive advice before making their second set of estimates (1=yes,
0=no).
Advice taking. Consistent with prior advice taking research, we used the “weight
of advice” (WOA) measure to assess participants’ receptivity to advice. This measure
gauges the extent to which participants revise their estimates in the direction of the
advisor’s estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Foster, 1997). The WOA measure
ranges from zero, which indicates that the advice has no impact on an individual’s final
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estimate, to one, which indicates that the final estimate is equal to the advice. The WOA
measure is computed as follows:
WOA 

final estimate  initial estimate
advice  initial estimate

.

If participants believe that they and their advisors are equally well informed, they should
weight their own and another person’s estimate equally, and the WOA score would
equal 0.5 (Larrick & Soll, 2006).
Pilot study. We pilot-tested the emotion induction clips with a non-overlapping
sample of participants (N=42). In the pilot study, we asked participants to watch one of
the two video clips and rate the emotions they experienced immediately after watching
the clip. To measure anxiety, we averaged responses for anxious, tense, and distressed
(=.92). To measure neutral feelings, we averaged responses for neutral, indifferent, and
unemotional (=.84). The results of the pilot study confirmed that these video clips
effectively induce anxiety and neutral feelings. Participants reported higher feelings of
anxiety when they watched the anxiety-inducing video clip (M=4.27, SD=2.37) than
when they watched the neutral clip (M=1.79, SD=1.41), t(40)=4.12, p<.001. In addition,
participants reported higher neutral feelings when they watched the neutral clip
(M=5.44, SD=2.05) than when they watched the anxiety-inducing one (M=2.54,
SD=1.91), t(40)=4.76, p<.001.
Results
Across all of our studies, we first conducted analyses that included gender and
age as independent variables. We found no main effects or interaction effects for these
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demographic variables, and we report all of our findings collapsed across demographic
groups.
Emotion Manipulation Check. Feelings of anxiety were higher in the anxiety
condition (M=6.83, SD=1.45) than in the neutral condition (M=1.75, SD=1.06),
t(100)=20.04, p<.001, and neutral feelings were higher in the neutral condition (M=4.37,
SD=1.70) than in the anxiety condition (M=2.44, SD=1.67), t(100)=5.80, p<.001. These
results suggest that our emotion induction was effective.
Advice Seeking. Consistent with our prediction that anxious individuals would
be more likely to seek advice than would individuals in a neutral state, 90% (47/52) of
participants in the anxiety condition sought advice, compared to 72% (36/50) in the
neutral condition, χ2(1,N=102)=5.68, p<.02.
Self-confidence. Consistent with our prediction, participants reported
significantly lower self-confidence in the anxiety condition (M=4.87, SD=1.84) than in
the neutral condition (M=6.21, SD=0.63), t(100)=-4.86, p<.001.
We then examined whether self-confidence mediated the relationship between
incidental anxiety and advice seeking (Baron & Kenny, 1986). As summarized in Table
1, by including self-confidence in our model, the influence of anxiety on advice seeking
was reduced to non-significance (from β=.24, p<.02 to β=.13, p=.24; 95% biascorrected CI, [.04, .15]), and self-confidence predicted advice seeking (β=-.26, p<.02).1

In this study, because our dependent variable was binary, we reran the mediation analyses using MacKinnon
and Dwyer’s (1993) logistic regression method and found the same pattern of results. We report the more
traditional approach in the interest of parsimony.
1
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These findings demonstrate that self-confidence mediates the relationship between
anxiety and advice seeking.
Advice Taking. We next examined whether incidental anxiety influenced advice
taking by using data only from participants who chose to seek advice before making
their revised estimates. As predicted, results from a repeated-measures ANOVA
demonstrate that advice taking was high in the anxiety condition (M=0.55, SD=0.26)
than in the neutral condition (M=0.39, SD=0.11), F(1,81)=11.55, p=.001, ηp2=.13.
Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that incidental anxiety increases both
advice seeking and advice taking. Furthermore, our results indicate that incidental
anxiety harms self-confidence, and that self-confidence mediates the relationship
between incidental anxiety and advice seeking.
Experiment 2: The Influence of Anxiety and Anger on Advice Taking
In Experiment 2, we extend our investigation of the relationship between anxiety and
advice taking by contrasting the influence of two negatively valenced emotions:
anxiety and anger. Although a substantial literature documents the misattribution of
the valence of emotions (e.g., Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), we postulate that it is the
certainty dimension of anxiety, not valence, that causes individuals to be more
receptive to advice. Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) appraisal theory of emotions
characterizes emotions across several dimensions. Anxiety and anger, though both
negatively valenced, differ along the dimension of certainty. Anxiety is characterized
by a sense of uncertainty, whereas anger is characterized by a sense of certainty.
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Consistent with our theoretical framework, we expect anxious feelings to increase
feelings of uncertainty, lower self-confidence, and increase advice taking.
Conversely, we expect anger to increase feelings of certainty, increase confidence,
and decrease advice taking. Compared to individuals in a neutral state, we expect
anxious individuals to be more receptive to advice, and we expect angry individuals
to be less receptive to advice. We expect self-confidence to mediate these
relationships.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-seven students (74 female, Mage=21.10, SD=2.56) at a
university in the Southern United States participated in the study for pay.
Participants received a $2 show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn an additional
$6 during the study.
Design and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three emotion-induction
conditions: anxiety, anger, or neutral. We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1,
with three important differences. First, in Experiment 2, in addition to an anxiety and a
neutral condition, we included an anger condition. In the anger condition, participants
watched a video clip from the movie My Bodyguard that portrays a man being treated
unfairly. This video clip has been effectively used in prior research to induce incidental
anger (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). Consistent with this design change, we added three
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additional emotions to assess anger (i.e., angry, mad, and furious, =.84) in the measure
of subjective feelings participants completed at the end of the study.
Second, we developed a different measure to assess participants’ self-confidence.
We developed this measure to capture certainty and perceived accuracy of one’s own
estimates. This measure of self-confidence included five items (=.76): “I think my
initial estimates are accurate,” “I think my initial estimates are close to the true value,”
“I am very certain about the accuracy of my judgments,” “I am sure I am performing
well on this task,” and “I have no doubt my estimates are close to the true values.”
Participants indicated their agreement with each item and other filler ones using a sevenpoint scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Half the participants answered these
questions after the emotion induction, and half answered these questions after they made
revised estimates.
Third, we did not ask participants whether or not they wanted to receive advice.
Instead, across all three conditions, every participant received advice prior to making
their revised estimate.
Results
We found no order effects for whether participants answered the self-confidence
questions after the emotion induction or after providing their revised estimates. We
report our findings collapsed across order conditions. In Table 2, we report descriptive
statistics for all of the variables we measured in this study.
Emotion Manipulation Check. Consistent with our emotion induction, feelings of
anxiety varied across conditions, F(2,124)=36.88, p<.001, ηp2=.37. Participants reported
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greater anxiety in the anxiety condition than they did in both the neutral condition and
the anger condition (both ps<.001); anxiety ratings did not differ in the latter two
conditions (p=.41). Neutral feelings also varied across conditions, F(2,124)=4.92, p<.01,
ηp2=.07: they were higher in the neutral condition than they were in both the anxiety
condition and the anger condition (both ps<.05), and these ratings did not differ in the
latter two conditions (p=.30). Finally, anger ratings differed by condition,
F(2,124)=22.96, p<.001, ηp2=.27: they were higher in the anger condition than in both
the anxiety condition and the neutral condition (both ps<.001), and anger ratings did not
differ in the latter two conditions (p=.44).
Advice Taking. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that advice use varied
across conditions, F(2,124)=20.06, p<.001, ηp2=.24. Participants were more receptive to
advice when they experienced incidental anxiety than when they experienced incidental
anger or neutral feelings (both ps<.01). Furthermore, participants were less receptive to
advice when they experienced incidental anger than when they experienced neutral
feelings (p<.01).
Self-confidence. Participants’ self-confidence also varied across conditions,
F(2,124)=35.17, p<.001, ηp2=.36; self-confidence was lower in the anxiety condition
than in either the anger or the neutral condition (both p’s<.001), and self-confidence was
higher in the anger than in the neutral condition (p<.001).
We next examined whether self-confidence mediated the effect of incidental
anxiety on advice taking (see Table 1).2 When we included self-confidence in the
In our regressions, we used the average WOA across the three rounds as the dependent variable and included
a dummy variable for the anger condition.
2
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regression, the effect of anxiety was reduced to non-significance (from β=.29, p=.001, to
β=.10, p=.27; 95% bias-corrected CI, [0.05, 0.18]), and self-confidence predicted advice
use (β=-.53, p<.001).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we extended our investigation of the link between anxiety and
receptivity to advice by contrasting two negatively-valenced emotions, anger and
anxiety. We find that negative valence cannot account for our findings in Experiment 1.
Angry participants were less receptive to advice than were those in both the neutral and
the anxiety conditions. We find that incidental anxiety reduces self-confidence and that
this lowered self-confidence mediates the relationship between anxiety and advice
taking.
Experiment 3: Anxiety and Perceptions of Advice Quality
In Experiment 3, we further test our theoretical model by using a different
method for inducing anxiety and by using a different measure of advice taking. We
also include a measure of advice quality to assess how anxiety influences
perceptions of advice quality.
Method
Participants
Seventy-nine students (44 female, Mage=23, SD=2.77) at a university in the Southern
United States participated in the study in exchange for a $2 show-up fee and the
opportunity to earn an additional $5.
Design and Procedure
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We randomly assigned participants to one of two experimental conditions:
neutral vs. anxiety. In each condition, participants listened to a music clip that induces
either anxiety or neutral feelings (see Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). As a cover story, we
informed participants that they would participate in several unrelated studies. We
informed participants that in one study we would ask them to evaluate music. We then
asked participants to wear headphones and listen to an audio clip while performing other
tasks. In the anxiety condition, participants listened to the theme music from the movie
Psycho. In the neutral condition, participants listened to Handel’s Water Music: Air.
Neither audio clip included vocal parts, and each clip was played on a continuous loop.
After reading general instructions about the audio clips, we informed participants
about another, ostensibly unrelated study titled “Individual Performance Under Time
Pressure.” We told participants they had three minutes to work on a math problem and
that they would receive a $5 bonus for identifying the correct solution out of the five
solutions provided. Furthermore, we told participants that they would receive
information from another participant who previously completed the same task but had
the opportunity to work on the problem for five minutes. Before working on the
problem, participants received an envelope with a handwritten note, supposedly from
this person, which read, “Choose Solution A [B, C, D, or E].” In this way, participants
received advice from this person before they had the chance to work on the problem on
their own. After reading the note, participants answered a series of questionnaires that
included our measure of self-confidence (the same measure employed in Experiment 2,
=.79). Then, they spent three minutes working on the problem.
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Once the three minutes were over, participants indicated which solution they
thought was correct among the five possible solutions. Thus, participants provided their
answer after having the opportunity to work on the problem and after reporting their
self-confidence. After choosing a solution, participants answered a series of questions
that included target questions interspersed with distracter questions. Our target questions
asked participants to assess the quality of the advice. Specifically, we asked participants
to indicate the extent to which the advice was likely to be accurate, was likely to be of
good quality, probably represented the right answer, and was likely to indicate the
correct answer (=.90) on seven-point scales (1=very unlikely, 7=very likely). We also
asked participants to indicate the extent to which the music made them feel various
emotions.
Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study with a non-overlapping sample of participants.
Thirty-five students from local universities in the Southern United States (52% male;
Mage=21, SD=2.69) participated in the pilot study in exchange for $3. In this pilot study,
we gave participants five minutes to solve a math problem. After three minutes, we
checked to see whether any of the participants had solved the problem. The problem
(previously used by Dunn, Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2011) read:
Two people are running around a square track. Each side of the track has a
length of 11 meters. Person A and person B begin at opposite corners of the
track, facing the same corner. If person A runs 3 meters per second and person B
runs 5 meters per second, how many meters will person B have run when they
pass each other for the fourth time?
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The correct solution is 96.25 meters. No participant solved the math problem correctly
in three minutes, and only two participants out of 35 were able to solve the problem in
the allotted five minutes. Consistent with Dunn et al. (2011), we found that this math
problem appears tractable to participants, but is in fact quite difficult to solve.
Results
Emotion Manipulation Check. Consistent with our induction, feelings of anxiety
were higher in the anxiety condition (M=5.73, SD=1.44) than in the neutral condition
(M=2.00, SD=1.36), t(77)=11.84, p<.001. In addition, neutral feelings were higher in
the neutral condition (M=4.62, SD=1.78) than in the anxiety condition (M=2.79,
SD=1.77), t(77)=4.59, p<.001.
Advice Taking. To measure advice taking, we coded the correspondence
between advisors’ recommendations and participants’ choices. If a participant’s choice
matched the advice, we coded the response as 1, and 0 otherwise. Sixty-eight percent of
the participants (27/40) took the advice in the anxiety condition, while only 41% of
participants (16/39) took the advice in the neutral condition, χ2(1,N=79)=5.58, p<.05.
Advice Quality. Similarly, perceived advice quality was higher in the anxiety
condition (M=5.07, SD=1.43) than in the neutral condition (M=4.27, SD=1.38),
t(77)=2.53, p<.05.
Self-confidence. As we predicted, participants who experienced anxiety reported
lower self-confidence (M=3.62, SD=1.06) than did participants in the neutral condition
(M=3.00, SD=0.79, t(77)=2.92, p=.005.
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We also conducted mediation analyses (see Table 1) and found that selfconfidence mediated the relationship between our emotion manipulation and
participants’ perceptions of advice quality (95% bias-corrected CI, [0.19, 1.11]) as well
as the relationship between anxiety and advice taking (95% bias-corrected CI, [0.24,
2.04]).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we again demonstrate that anxiety decreases confidence in
one’s own estimates, increases perceptions of advice quality, and increases receptivity
to advice. This experiment extends our investigation by replicating these relationships
with a different emotion induction and a very different advice-taking task.
Experiment 4: Self-Confidence and Information Processing as Potential
Mediators
In Experiments 1-3, we identify lower confidence as the mechanism that
mediates the relationships between anxiety and advice seeking and anxiety and advice
taking. In Experiment 4, we consider an alternative mediator for the relationship
between anxiety and advice taking: impaired information processing.
In addition to lowering self-confidence, anxiety impairs the ability to process
information (Eysenck, 1982; Sengutpa & Johar, 2001). As a result, anxious individuals
perform poorly on tasks that demand cognitive resources (Chen, 1996; Deffenbacher,
1977; Hamilton, 1975; Ganzer, 1968; Mueller, 1976). When individuals feel anxious,
they divert cognitive resources to activities such as worrying and retain fewer cognitive
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resources for the task at hand (Eysenck, 1979, 1982) and take longer to draw inferences
(e.g., Darke, 1988).
In Experiment 4, we use the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) to assess information
processing. In this study, we consider both self-confidence and information processing
as potential mediators of the relationship between anxiety and advice taking.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-two students and adults (58 male, Mage=32, SD=9.06) from
a city in the Northeastern United States participated in the study in exchange for a $4
show-up fee and the opportunity to earn an additional $12.
Design and Procedure
We used a between-subjects design, and randomly assigned participants to one of
two emotion conditions: anxiety vs. neutral. At the beginning of the experiment, we
informed participants that they would complete three unrelated studies that had been
combined for the sake of convenience: the “Estimation Study” (which included two
parts), the “Vivid Recall Study” (where we introduced our emotion manipulation) and
the “Word Recognition Task” (which we used to assess information processing).
Estimation Study, Part 1: Initial estimates. We told participants that they would
be randomly assigned to the role of either adviser or advice recipient, and that another
person taking the study would be assigned to the other role. All participants were
actually assigned to the role of advice recipient. Across three rounds, participants
viewed a photograph of a jar filled with coins and estimated the amount of money in
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each jar. In both Part 1 (initial estimates) and Part 2 (revised estimates), participants
received an additional $2 if their estimate fell within 25 cents of the true amount of
money in the jar.
Emotion induction. After providing three initial estimates, participants completed
a (purportedly unrelated) study, the “Vivid Recall Study,” which was actually our
emotion manipulation (anxiety vs. neutral). In this study, we used a writing induction.
We asked participants to write a short essay. In the neutral condition, the instructions
read:
Please take a few minutes to answer the following question as truthfully as
possible. Once you’ve finished, then go on to the next task. Please describe, as
best you can, how you typically spend your evenings. You might begin by
writing down a detailed description of your activities, and then figure out how
much time you devote to each activity. Please write in complete sentences. And,
if you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might be
able to understand how you typically spend your evenings.
In the anxiety condition, the instructions read:
Please take a few minutes to answer the following question as truthfully as
possible. Once you’ve finished, then go on to the next task. Please describe, as
best you can, a situation you experienced in the past that made you feel very
anxious. You might begin by writing down a description of your feelings toward
someone or something that caused you to feel high levels of anxiety. Then write
about the details of such situation/moment. Please write in complete sentences.
And, if you can, please write your description so that someone reading this might
be able to understand the feelings you had.
Information processing task. After the emotion induction, participants completed
a “Word Recognition Task” (i.e., Stroop task to measure information processing) and
answered a short questionnaire that assessed self-confidence. We counterbalanced the
order in which the Stroop task and the questionnaire were presented to participants.
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In the Stroop task, we presented participants with the names of different colors.
For ten rounds, the color names matched the word (e.g., “RED” was printed in red). For
a second set of ten rounds, the color names appeared in colors that did not match the
word (e.g., “RED” was printed in yellow). In each round, as soon as the word appeared
on the screen, participants were asked to type the color of the text as fast as they could.
We recorded the time it took them to type the color of the text in each round. We
computed the difference in time between the incongruent and congruent trials and used
this difference as an assessment of information processing (DeWall, Baumeister, &
Vohs, 2008; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005).
Estimation Study, Part 2: Revised estimates. After completing the Stroop task
and the questionnaire, we asked participants to re-estimate the amount of money in each
of the jars they had seen in Part 1 of the estimation study. This time, however,
participants received an estimate from another participant in addition to seeing their own
initial estimates from Part 1.
Final questionnaire. Participants completed a final questionnaire with
demographic information and a manipulation check. Specifically, we asked participants
to think back to the writing task and to indicate the extent to which they felt various
emotions.
Results
Emotion Manipulation Check. Feelings of anxiety were higher in the anxiety
condition (M=5.64, SD=2.11) than they were in the neutral condition (M=1.85,
SD=1.46), t(120)=11.68, p<.001. Neutral feelings were higher in the neutral condition
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than they were in the anxiety condition (M=3.73, SD=1.96 vs. M=2.53, SD=1.94,
t[120]=3.36, p=.001).
Advice Taking. As predicted, results from a repeated-measures ANOVA
demonstrated that advice use in the anxiety condition was significantly higher (M=0.61,
SD=0.37) than in the neutral condition (M=0.36, SD=0.41), F(1,120)=15.66, p<.001,
ηp2=.12.
Information Processing. We assessed information processing by computing the
difference in response time for each participant between the congruent and incongruent
words in the Stroop task. Lower scores reflect faster response times and indicate better
information processing. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007), we
found that information processing was lower (changes in the response times were
higher) for participants in the anxiety condition than for those in the neutral condition
(8.33 sec on average vs. 3.85 sec), t(120)=3.77, p<.001.
Self-confidence. In addition, and consistent with our previous findings, selfconfidence was lower for participants in the anxiety condition (M=5.23, SD=1.10) than
it was for those in the neutral condition (M=5.95, SD=0.92), t(120)=3.95, p<.001.
Mediation Analysis. We conducted mediation analyses to test whether selfconfidence and impaired information processing mediated the effect of anxiety on
advice taking. We first considered self-confidence alone as a mediator (see Table 1).
When emotion condition and self-confidence were both entered into a regression model
predicting advice taking, the effect of condition was significantly reduced (from β=.34,
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p<.001, to β=.18, p<.05; 95% bias-corrected CI, [.05, .21]), and self-confidence
significantly predicted advice taking (β=-.47, p<.001).
Next, we considered impaired information processing as a mediator. Although
emotion condition predicted information processing (β=.33, p<.001), when we included
both emotion condition and information processing in a regression model predicting
advice taking, information processing did not significantly predict advice taking (β=.10, p=.29). Therefore, the effect of information processing did not mediate the
relationship between anxiety and advice taking.3
Discussion
In Experiment 4, we considered both impaired information processing and lower
self-confidence as potential mediators of the relationship between anxiety and advice
taking. We found that anxiety does impair information processing, but that only
diminished self-confidence, not impaired information processing, mediates the link
between anxiety and advice taking.
Experiment 5: Anxiety and the Ability to Discern
In Experiments 5a-c, we extend our investigation of the influence of anxiety on
advice taking by exploring the consequences of experiencing low confidence. By
harming self-confidence, anxiety widens an individual’s confidence interval around an
estimate and expands the range of ideas an individual is likely to consider to be
reasonable. As a result, anxious individuals are likely to be more receptive to bad advice

We note that when both self-confidence and information-processing were entered into the regression model
simultaneously, self-confidence predicted advice taking (β=-.47, p<.001) but information processing did not
(β=-.10, p=.21).
3
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than individuals in a neutral emotional state. Therefore, the relationship we identify
linking anxiety and advice taking may present a particularly important problem when
advice is bad.
Experiment 5a: Anxiety and the Ability to Perceive Advice Quality
In Experiment 5a, we examine how anxiety influences perceptions of
advice quality.
Method
Participants
We recruited 103 adults from a U.S. representative sample (52 male, Mage=45,
SD=15.95) to participate in an online study in exchange for $6.
Design and Procedure
We randomly assigned respondents to one of four experimental conditions using
a 2 (Emotion: neutral vs. anxiety) x 2 (Advice quality: reasonable vs. unreasonable)
between-subjects design.
We manipulated emotions by asking participants to engage in the same writing
task we used in Experiment 4. After the emotion induction, we showed participants three
photos of jars filled with coins, one photo at a time. Along with the photo, we showed
participants an estimate of the value of the jar provided by another participant. We
informed participants that the other participant had previously participated in the study
in the role of advisor. For each jar, we asked participants to evaluate both how accurate
and how reasonable the advisor’s estimate was using a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 =
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not at all, to 7 = very much). Responses to the two questions were highly correlated
(r=.86, p<.001), and we report averaged responses to these questions.
After the three rounds, we asked participants to think back to the writing task and
to indicate the extent to which they felt different emotions.
Pilot Study
Prior to conducting the main study, we conducted a pilot study with a nonoverlapping sample of participants (N=79). We asked these participants to view the
same three photographs of jars filled with coins and to make estimates that they would
offer as advice to future participants. We informed participants that we would pay them
for accuracy. We used these data to create two types of advice; we used the mean
estimate from the pilot study as the value for “reasonable” advice, and we used the value
two standard deviations above the mean as “unreasonable” advice. On average, the
reasonable advice was $2.30 lower than the true value of the jar, and the unreasonable
advice as $5.29 higher than the true value of the jar.
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Check. Consistent with our manipulation, self-reported
neutral feelings were higher in the neutral condition (M=4.24, SD=2.20) than in the
anxiety condition (M=2.61, SD=1.74), F(1,99)=16.55, p<.001, ηp2=.14, and self-reported
feelings of anxiety were higher in the anxiety condition (M=4.66, SD=2.21) than in the
neutral condition (M=2.15, SD=1.60), F(1,99)=43.62, p<.001, ηp2=.31.
Perceived Advice Quality. In each round, we averaged participants’ responses to
the accuracy and reasonableness questions and used these ratings as a measure of
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perceived advice quality. A 2 (anxiety vs. neutral) x 2 (reasonable vs. unreasonable
advice) repeated-measures between-subjects ANOVA (repeated on round) revealed that
participants rated the advice higher on quality in the reasonable-advice condition
(M=5.49, SD=1.27) than in the unreasonable-advice condition (M=4.52, SD=1.34),
F(1,99)=21.88, p<.001, ηp2=.18.
More interestingly, we found that perceived advice quality was higher in the
anxiety condition (M=5.42, SD=1.28) than in the neutral condition (M=4.66, SD=1.38),
F(1,99)=15.55, p<.001, ηp2=.14. We also found a significant interaction between advice
quality and emotion condition, F(1,99)=11.01, p=.001, ηp2=.10. When participants
experienced incidental anxiety, we found no significant difference in ratings of
perceived advice quality between the reasonable and unreasonable advice (M=5.56,
SD=1.37 vs. M=5.29, SD=1.19), F(1,44)<1, p=.40, ηp2=.02. When participants were in a
neutral state, however, ratings of perceived advice quality were higher in the reasonableadvice condition (M=5.44, SD=1.21) than they were in the unreasonable-advice
condition (M=3.86, SD=1.05), F(1,55)=41.69, p<.001, ηp2=.43 (see Figure 2).
Overall, these results suggest that, compared to participants in a neutral
emotional state, participants in the anxiety condition were less discerning between good
and bad advice.
Experiment 5b: Anxiety and Receptivity to Bad Advice
In Experiment 5a, we focused on the relationship between anxiety and perceived
advice quality. In Experiment 5b, we explore how anxiety influences advice taking when
advice is poor.
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Method
Participants
One hundred eighty-nine students (118 female, Mage=21, SD=2.29) at a
university in the Southern United States participated in the study in exchange for a $2
show-up fee and the opportunity to earn an additional $6.
Design and Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to one of six experimental conditions using a
2 (Emotion: neutral vs. anxiety) x 3 (Advice quality: reasonable vs. unreasonably high
vs. unreasonably low) between-subjects design.
As in Experiment 4, we manipulated emotions with a writing task and we asked
participants to estimate the value of jars filled with coins. In Part 1 and Part 2 of the
estimation task, participants received an additional $1 if their estimate fell within 25
cents of the true amount in the jar.
To manipulate advice quality, we used the same “reasonable” advice values as
those we used in Experiment 5a. In this study, we included both “unreasonably high”
advice, the value two standard deviations above the reasonable value in the pilot study
(on average, $5.29 above the true value of the jar), and “unreasonably low” advice, the
value two standard deviations below the reasonable value in the pilot study (on average,
$9.90 below the true value of the jar). Our primary dependent measure was weight of
advice. As in our other studies, we measured emotion, self-confidence, and
demographics.
Results and Discussion

93
Emotion Manipulation Check. Neutral feelings (α=.84) were higher in the neutral
condition than they were in the anxiety condition (M=4.66, SD=2.20 vs. M=3.09,
SD=2.03), F(1,183)=25.74, p<.001, ηp2=.12, and feelings of anxiety (α=.92) were higher
in the anxiety condition than they were in the neutral condition (M=4.45, SD=2.23 vs.
M=1.92, SD=1.49), F(1,183)=79.61, p<.001, ηp2=.30.
Advice-taking. We conducted a 2 (anxiety vs. neutral) x 3 (reasonable vs.
unreasonably high vs. unreasonably low advice) repeated-measures between-subjects
ANOVA (repeated measure on round). We found that anxiety significantly influenced
advice-taking, F(1,183)=58.41, p<.001, ηp2=.24. The effect of advice quality was not
significant, F(2,183)=1.85, p=.16, ηp2=.02, but the interaction term was marginally
significant, F(2,183)=2.56, p=.08, ηp2=.03.
In the neutral condition, advice use differed across advice quality (F[2,85]=4.70,
p<.02, ηp2=.10). Participants in the neutral condition were less receptive to unreasonably
high and unreasonably low advice than they were to reasonable advice. Participants in
the anxiety condition, however, were not less receptive to unreasonable advice than they
were to reasonable advice (F[2,98]<1, p=.93, ηp2=.001). We depict these results in
Figure 3.
Self-confidence. Participants in the anxiety condition reported lower selfconfidence than did participants in the neutral condition (M=4.75, SD=1.76 vs. M=5.95,
SD=1.44; F[1,183]=27.29, p<.001, ηp2=.13). Advice quality did not influence selfconfidence.
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We next tested for self-confidence as a mediator (see Table 1). The effect of
anxiety on advice use was significantly reduced when we included self-confidence in the
equation (95% bias-corrected CI, [.13, .27]), and self-confidence significantly predicted
advice taking. These results further demonstrate that self-confidence mediates the effect
of incidental anxiety on advice taking.
Although participants in the neutral condition were able to discriminate between
good and bad advice, discounting both unreasonably high and low advice, participants in
the anxiety condition did not.
Experiment 5c: Anxiety and an Advisor’s Accuracy
In Experiments 5a-5b, we found that anxiety impairs the ability to discriminate
between good and bad advice. In Experiment 5c, we explore this relationship in a
different way by explicitly manipulating the historical accuracy of the advisor.
Method
Participants
One hundred eighteen students (48 male, Mage=20.89, SD=2.18) at a university in
the northeastern United States participated in the study in exchange for a $2 show-up fee
and the opportunity to earn an additional $6.
Design and Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to one of four experimental conditions using
a 2 (Emotion: neutral vs. anxiety) x 2 (Advisor accuracy: accurate vs. less accurate)
between-subjects design. We used the same estimation task (jar of coins) and the same
emotion induction (writing task) as we did in Experiment 5b.

95
For the second part of the estimation task, we informed participants that they
would receive advice from an individual who had made estimates in a prior study and
was paid based on accuracy. In the accurate-advisor condition, we told participants that
the advisor’s prior estimates were accurate 80% of the time. That is, the advisor had
given an estimate within $0.25 of the true value 80% of the time. In the less-accurate
advisor condition, we told participants that the advisor’s prior estimates were accurate
50% of the time. In reality, the advice values did not differ across conditions.
When participants received the advisor’s estimates, they evaluated how accurate
and reasonable they perceived the estimates to be (from 1=not at all, to 7=very much).
We combined these two items to measure perceived advice quality (average α across
rounds =.91).
Results
Emotion Manipulation Check. Consistent with our manipulation, neutral feelings
were higher in the neutral than in the anxiety condition (M=4.69, SD=2.09 vs. M=3.02,
SD=2.03), F(1,114)=19.54, p<.001, ηp2=.15, and feelings of anxiety were higher in the
anxiety than in the neutral condition (M=4.33, SD=2.37 vs. M=2.02, SD=1.67),
F(1,114)=36.78, p<.001, ηp2=.24.
Advice taking. We conducted a 2 (emotion) x 2 (advisor accuracy) repeatedmeasures between-subjects ANOVA (repeated measure on round) with advice use as the
dependent variable. We found that anxiety significantly increased advice taking,
F(1,114)=30.25, p<.001, ηp2=.21. The effect of advisor accuracy was not significant,
F(1,114)=2.39, p=.13, ηp2=.02, but the interaction was, F(1,114)=4.38, p<.05, ηp2=.04.
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In the neutral condition, participants were less receptive to advice in the less-accurate
advisor condition than they were in the accurate-advisor condition (MWOA=0.11,
SD=0.24 and MWOA=0.34, SD=0.38, respectively), F(1,56)=8.36, p<.01, ηp2=.13.
Participants in the anxiety condition, however, were not less receptive to advice based
on advisor accuracy (MWOA=0.60, SD=0.42 and MWOA=0.56, SD=0.38, respectively).
Perceived Advice Quality. We conducted the same analysis using perceived
advice quality as the dependent variable. As expected, participants rated advice quality
higher in the accurate-advisor condition (M=5.49, SD=1.19) than they did in the lessaccurate advisor condition (M=4.66, SD=1.34), F(1,114)=23.68, p<.001, ηp2=.17. On
average, participants rated the estimates as more accurate and reasonable in the anxiety
condition (M=5.47, SD=1.13) than they did in the neutral condition (M=4.62, SD=1.39),
F(1,114)=22.74, p<.001, ηp2=.17.
Interestingly, we found a significant interaction between advisor accuracy and
the emotion condition, F(1,114)=17.75, p<.001, ηp2=.14. When participants experienced
neutral feelings, they perceived the advice to be more accurate in the accurate-advisor
condition (M=5.44, SD=1.15) than in the less-accurate advisor condition (M=3.80,
SD=1.09), F(1,56)=42.22, p<.001, ηp2=.43. However, when participants felt anxious,
they perceived the advice to be similarly accurate across the two conditions (M=5.54,
SD=1.24 vs. M=5.42, SD=1.05), F(1,58)<1, p=.65, ηp2=.004.
Self-confidence. A 2 (emotions) x 2 (advisor accuracy) between-subjects
ANOVA with self-confidence as the dependent variable revealed that participants in the
anxiety condition reported lower self-confidence than did participants in the neutral
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condition (M=4.65, SD=1.84 vs. M=5.78, SD=1.57), F(1,114)=13.08, p<.001, ηp2=.10.
We found no other significant effect (both p’s>.16). Importantly, self-confidence
mediated the relationship between anxiety and advice taking (95% bias-corrected CI,
[.07, .25]), as well as the relationship between anxiety and perceived advice quality
(95% bias-corrected CI, [.03, .31]), as summarized in Table 1.
Discussion
In Experiment 5c, we manipulated the purported accuracy of the advisor and
found that anxiety increased reliance upon advice from both very accurate and less
accurate advisors. Consistent with our findings in Experiments 5a and 5b, anxious
participants were less discerning than participants in a neutral state. Participants in the
neutral condition relied more heavily on advice when the advisor was purportedly very
accurate than when the advisor was purportedly less accurate. Anxious participants,
however, relied heavily on advice from both types of advisors.
Experiment 6: Anxiety and Biased Advisors
In Experiment 6, we examine the influence of anxiety on advice taking when
advisees know that advisors have a conflict of interest. Since anxious individuals are
less discerning than those in a neutral emotional state, they may be particularly
susceptible to biased advice from advisors with a disclosed conflict of interest.
Method
Participants
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One hundred thirty-nine college students (81 male, Mage=20, SD=0.66) at a
university in the southeastern United States participated in the study in exchange for a
$2 show-up fee and the opportunity to earn an additional $6.
Design and Procedure
We randomly assigned participants to one of four experimental conditions using
a 2 (Emotion: neutral vs. anxiety) x 2 (Advisor conflict: conflict of interest vs. no
conflict of interest) between-subjects design. We used a procedure very similar to the
one we used in Experiments 4-5.
For the estimation task, we told participants, “You will be randomly assigned to
the role of either advisor or advice recipient. Another person in the room will be
assigned to the other role.” In reality, every participant was assigned to the role of
advice recipient. We also informed participants that they would receive a bonus for the
accuracy of their estimates; specifically, we told participants that they would earn a $1
bonus every time their estimate was within 25 cents of the true amount.
For the revised estimates, we used the same values as in the reasonable advice
condition in Experiments 5a and 5b. Before receiving advice, we told participants that
their advisor had an informational advantage. Specifically, we informed participants that
the advisor had been given additional information about the range of values for each jar.
In addition, we adapted Cain et al.’s (2005) conflict of interest disclosure for our
manipulation. Each participant read one of two conflict of interest disclosures. In the
conflict of interest condition, the instructions read:
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Your advisor’s payment depends on how much your estimate exceeds the value
of the coins in the jar. In particular, in each round, the advisor will receive $1 for
every 25 cents your estimate exceeds the actual value of the jar of coins.
In the no conflict of interest condition, the instructions read:
Your advisor’s payment depends on how accurate you are in estimating the value
of the coins in the jar. In particular, in each round, the advisor will receive $1
every time your estimate is within 25 cents of the actual value of the jar of coins.
Results
Emotion Manipulation Check. Consistent with our manipulation, participants
reported higher neutral feelings in the neutral condition (M=5.72, SD=2.06) than they
did in the anxiety condition (M=3.62, SD=2.20), F(1,135)=34.42, p<.001, ηp2=.20, and
they reported higher anxiety in the anxiety condition (M=4.46, SD=2.42) than they did in
the neutral condition (M=2.06, SD=1.55), F(1,135)=48.29, p<.001, ηp2=.26.
Advice Taking. We conducted a 2 (emotion) x 2 (advisor conflict) repeatedmeasures between-subjects ANOVA (repeated measure on round) with advice use as the
dependent variable. Advice taking was higher in the anxiety condition than in the neutral
condition (MWOA=0.60 vs. 0.24), F(1,135)=35.19, p<.001, ηp2=.21. The main effect of
conflict of interest was not significant, F(1,135)=1.62, p=.21, ηp2=.01, and the
interaction was marginally significant, F(1,135)=3.38, p<.07, ηp2=.02.
We hypothesized that, compared to individuals in a neutral emotional state,
individuals experiencing anxiety would fail to discount advice from advisors with a
conflict of interest. The results are directionally consistent with this hypothesis.
Participants who felt anxious weighed advice similarly when their advisor did and did
not have a conflict of interest (MWOA=0.61 vs. 0.58), F(1,68)<1, p=.70, ηp2=.002. In
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contrast, participants in the neutral condition discounted the advice significantly more
from an advisor with a conflict of interest than from an advisor without a conflict of
interest (MWOA=0.15 vs. 0.34), F(1,67)=5.06, p<.03, ηp2=.07. We depict this pattern of
results in Figure 4.
In this experiment, participants knew that advisors with a conflict of interest
earned money when their revised estimates were higher than the true value of the jar.
Thus, we examine weight of advice measures for participants whose initial estimates
were lower than the advice value. We find that anxiety significantly increased advice
taking, F(1,72)=12.35, p=.001, ηp2=.15. The main effect of conflict of interest was not
significant, F(1,72)=1.77, p=.19, ηp2=.02, but the interaction was, F(1,72)=4.16, p<.05,
ηp2=.06. The presence of a conflict of interest did not affect the extent to which anxious
participants were receptive to the advice (MWOA=0.52 with a conflict of interest vs. 0.47
without a conflict of interest; p=.62), but it did influence the extent to which participants
in the neutral condition discounted the advice. Specifically, participants in the neutral
condition discounted advice more from an advisor with a conflict of interest than they
did from an advisor without a conflict of interest (MWOA=0.10 vs. 0.36), F(1,29)=6.75,
p<.02, ηp2=.19.
Self-confidence. Self-confidence (=.81) varied by condition (F[1,135]=14.06,
p<.001, ηp2=.09). Participants in the anxiety condition reported lower self-confidence
than did those in the neutral condition (M=5.48, SD=0.79 vs. M=5.96, SD=0.68). The
conflict of interest manipulation did not influence self-confidence, and we found no
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interaction between the conflict of interest manipulation and the emotion condition on
self-confidence.
We also tested whether self-confidence mediated the relationship between
anxiety and advice taking and found evidence for mediation (see Table 1).
Discussion
As we found in Experiments 1-5, compared to individuals in a neutral emotional
state, anxious individuals are more receptive to advice and self-confidence mediates this
relationship. In this final experiment, we examined a particular case of bad advice: when
advisors have a conflict of interest. We found that anxious individuals remained very
receptive to advice, even when their advisor had a disclosed conflict of interest.
General Discussion
Across eight experiments, we document a robust relationship between anxiety
and receptivity to advice. Compared to people in a neutral emotional state, people who
feel anxious are more likely to seek advice and are more likely to rely on the advice they
receive. This pattern of results does not generalize to other negatively-valenced
emotions, such as anger.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Eysenck, 1992), we find that anxiety impairs
information processing. The relationship between anxiety and advice taking, however, is
not mediated by impaired information processing; rather, it is mediated by reduced selfconfidence. Anxiety lowers self-confidence, which, in turn, increases advice seeking and
reliance upon advice (see Figure 1). Our results also demonstrate that anxiety impairs
the ability to discriminate between reasonable and unreasonable advice. Anxious
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individuals rely heavily on advice, even when the advice is bad and advisors have a
conflict of interest.
Across our studies, we employed different emotion inductions and different
decision tasks. We examined both advice taking and the relatively understudied decision
to seek advice. In our studies, we manipulated incidental anxiety, which offered a
conservative test of the relationship between anxiety and advice taking. In practice,
decision makers are likely to be influenced not only by incidental anxiety from an
unrelated and irrelevant source, but also by directed anxiety triggered by the decision
domain itself (e.g., choosing a surgery option in a hospital setting) and by other people
(e.g., a realtor who may induce anxiety while recommending a purchase price for a
house).
Prescriptively, our findings highlight the importance of assessing advice quality,
especially when individuals are anxious. Though individuals in a neutral emotional state
were able to discern good advice from bad advice, anxious individuals were less
discerning and very receptive to extreme values and bad advice. Our findings underscore
the importance of assessing advice quality in general, but when individuals are anxious
in particular.
Theoretical Implications
Our findings extend our understanding of the influence of anxiety on cognition
and motivation. Prior work has found that anxiety impairs cognitive performance (e.g.,
Eysenck, 1982; Sengupta & Johar, 2001). Our work demonstrates that anxiety also
influences motivation. By eroding self-confidence, anxiety motivates individuals to
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reduce uncertainty and both to seek and to rely on advice from others. Future research
should extend our investigation to study both cognitive and motivational consequences
of experiencing incidental and directed emotions.
Our findings also deepen our understanding of the advice process. We document
the influence of anxiety, we consider the influence of bad and biased advice, and we
investigate the decision to seek advice as well as the decision to take advice. Rather than
making decisions in isolation, individuals often make decisions after receiving input
from others. This is especially true for exactly the types of decisions that are likely to
trigger anxiety—important and novel domains that have the potential for adverse
consequences.
In our investigation, we devoted particular attention to conditions under which
advice taking may harm decision making. By considering contexts in which advice is
bad and advisors have a conflict of interest, we identified systematic ways in which
advice taking may harm individuals.
Further, we studied both the decision to take advice and the decision to seek
advice. A growing literature has begun to study how people integrate the information
they receive from others (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Larrick & Soll, 2006). Very little
work, however, has investigated the critical precursor to that process: the decision to
seek advice.
Finally, our work contributes to extant research highlighting the importance of
emotions in interpersonal and organizational settings (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995;
Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Zerbe, 2000; Brief & Weiss, 2002; Fineman, 1993; Fisher &
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Ashkanasy, 2000; Judge & Ilies, 2004). Many organizational settings induce stress (e.g.,
Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Driskell & Salas, 1996) and anxiety (D’Aveni, 1995;
Hartley et al., 1991; Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Härtel, 2002), but little prior research has
studied how anxiety might influence organizationally relevant decision making, such as
reliance upon advice from peers and managers.
Limitations and Future Directions
The contribution of our work is qualified by limitations of our investigation. We
identify these as both limitations and opportunities for future research. Across our
studies, advisors and decision makers never met face-to-face. Although this approach
afforded us experimental control, future work could examine the influence of anxiety on
the advice process in face-to-face encounters.
In our studies, we considered contexts in which advice is poor and when advisors
have a conflict of interest. Future work should explore these domains to develop our
understanding of when advice systematically harms decision making. Specifically, this
work should identify strategies for curtailing the effects of harmful advice. For example,
anxious individuals who are particularly prone to bad advice may become less receptive
to poor advice if they recognize and regulate their emotions.
Another limitation of the present work is the use of tasks that required a
judgment or a solution to a problem that may not have been highly self-relevant to
participants. Often, we consult others for their opinion when facing decisions that are
important to us such as choosing a career or a medical treatment. Future research could
extend our investigation by employing tasks that are high in self-relevance. Quite
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possibly, self-relevance may exacerbate the influence of anxiety on advice seeking and
advice taking.
Future work should also examine the interpersonal consequences of feeling
anxious. For example, in addition to influencing decision processes, expressions of
anxiety may influence relational outcomes. Little is known about how anxiety is
communicated or may spread via contagion between individuals.
Many open questions remain with respect to the broader influence of anxiety on
behavior. For example, small amounts of anxiety may be very constructive. Norem and
Chang (2002) found that a small amount of anxiety causes people to prepare more
thoroughly in advance of anxiety-inducing events. In other work, Alter et al. (2010)
found that reappraising feelings of anxiety as excitement (i.e., reframing threats as
challenges) can both improve motivation and diminish stereotype threat. Quite possibly,
both the magnitude and timing of anxious feelings moderate the influence of anxiety on
behavior.
Overall, our findings describe robust relationships between anxiety and advice
seeking and anxiety and advice taking. Anxiety erodes self-confidence and causes
individuals to seek advice from others and to be less discriminating between good and
bad advice. Informed by these findings, we conclude by offering our own advice to
anyone who might be anxious: be wary of an advisor’s conflict of interest and be
particularly vigilant about the quality of advice you receive.
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Tables
Table 1
Mediation analyses, Experiment 1-6. The table reports standardized coefficients for
each regression. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
(a) Experiment 1

Anxiety

Selfconfidence
XM

Advice
seeking
XY

Advice
seeking
X, M  Y

-.44***

.24*

.13

Self-confidence
R2

-.26*
.19***

.06*

95% bias-corrected
CI

.11**
[1.05, 5.80]

(b) Experiment 2

Anxiety
Anger

Selfconfidence
XM

Advice taking
XY

Advice taking
X, M  Y

-.37***
.32***

.29**
-.28**

.10
-.11

Self-confidence
R2
95% bias-corrected
CI

-.53***
.36***

.24***

.42***
[.05, .18]
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(c) Experiment 3
Selfconfidence
XM

Advice
quality
XY

Advice
quality
X, M  Y

Advice
taking
X, M Y

Advice
taking
X, M  Y

-.32**

.28*

.07
-.67***

.27*

.12
-.46***

.10**

.08*

.48***

.07*

.26***

Anxiety
Selfconfidence
R2
95% biascorrected
CI

[.19, 1.11]

[.24, 2.04]

(d) Experiment 4
Selfconfidence
XM

Advice taking
XY

Advice taking
X, M  Y

Anxiety
Self-confidence

-.72***

.34***

.18*
-.47***

R2

.12***

.12***

.31***

95% bias-corrected
CI

[.05, .21]
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(e) Experiment 5b
Selfconfidence
XM

Advice taking
XY

Advice taking
X, M  Y

Anxiety
Unreasonably high

-.36***
.13

.49**
-.15*

.22***
-.06

Unreasonably low

.15

-.14

-.03

Self-confidence

-.74***

R2

.14***

.25***

95% bias-corrected
CI

.72***
[.13, .27]

(f) Experiment 5c

Anxiety
Advice
accuracy
Selfconfidence
R2
95% biascorrected CI

Selfconfidence
XM

Advice
quality
XY

Advice
quality
X, M  Y

Advice
taking
X, M Y

Advice
taking
X, M  Y

-.32***
-.12

.37***
.36***

.32***
.34***

.46***
.12

.25***
.05

-.18*
.12**

.26***

.29***
[.03, .31]

-.63***
.22***

.57***
[.07, .25]
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(g) Experiment 6

Anxiety
Advisor conflict

Selfconfidence
XM

Advice taking
XY

Advice taking
X, M  Y

-.32***
.07

.47***
-.10

.32***
-.06

Self-confidence
R2
95% bias-corrected
CI

-.47***
.10**

.22***

.42***
[.06, .19]
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Table 2

Means and standard deviations by condition, Experiment 2.
Feelings of
anxiety

Neutral
feelings

Feelings of
anger

Advice
taking
(DV)

Selfconfidence
(mediator)

Anxiety

4.46 (1.39)

2.45 (1.57)

1.75 (1.02)

0.51 (0.30)

3.21 (1.14)

Neutral
condition
Anger
condition

1.97 (1.51)

3.50 (1.68)

1.55 (1.12)

0.36 (0.16)

4.09 (0.74)

2.23 (1.49)

2.81 (1.45)

3.09 (1.24)

0.21 (0.14)

4.84 (0.72)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Theoretical Model.
Figure 2. Interaction of Emotion and Advice Quality on Perceived Quality (Experiment
5a)
Figure 3. Interaction of Emotion and Advice Quality on Advice Taking (Experiment 5b)
Figure 4. Interaction of Emotion and Conflict of Interest on Advice Taking (Experiment
6)
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
1

Advice Taking

Mean Weight of Advice (WOA)
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0.5
Unreasonably Low
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Figure 4

1

Advice Taking

Mean Weight of Advice (WOA)
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CHAPTER 3.
GET EXCITED:
REAPPRAISING PRE-PERFORMANCE ANXIETY AS EXCITEMENT

Alison Wood Brooks

ABSTRACT
Individuals often feel anxious in anticipation of tasks such as speaking in public or
meeting with a boss. Feeling anxious immediately before or during performance tasks
drains working memory, decreases self-confidence, and harms performance.
Anticipating the harmful effects of anxiety, many people attempt to down-regulate
anxiety. We find that an overwhelming majority of people believe trying to calm down
is the best way to cope with pre-performance anxiety. However, across several studies
involving karaoke singing, public speaking, and math performance, we demonstrate that
reappraising anxiety as excitement is more effective. Compared to individuals who
attempt to calm themselves down, individuals who reappraise their pre-performance
anxiety as excitement adopt an opportunity mindset (as opposed to a threat mindset) and
improve their subsequent performance.
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REAPPRAISING PRE-PERFORMANCE ANXIETY AS EXCITEMENT

During World War II, England’s Ministry of Information commissioned a public
safety slogan: Keep Calm and Carry On. Sixty years later, the slogan resurfaced and
went viral, with hundreds of thousands of retail products and derivative slogans
dominating internet marketplaces by 2007. In an attempt to explain the popularity of the
slogan, one New York Times writer conjectured that Keep Calm and Carry On
“resonates all over the world” (New York Times magazine, July 1, 2009). In this paper,
we investigate why trying to keep calm resonates with people, and we test the
effectiveness of trying to keep calm during moments of high anxiety.
Individuals feel anxious often, especially prior to important tasks like speaking
publicly or meeting with a boss. When felt immediately before or during a task, anxiety
drains working memory capacity, decreases self-confidence, and harms performance
(Eysenck, 1992). Anticipating the negative consequences of feeling anxious, many
individuals attempt to down-regulate anxiety by trying to calm down. But decreasing
anxious feelings is difficult because high arousal is automatic, and suppressing or hiding
anxiety is often ineffective (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2009).
Across several experimental studies, we test an alternative strategy: reappraising
pre-performance anxiety as excitement. Whereas anxiety is a negative, aversive emotion
that harms performance, excitement is a positive, pleasant emotion that can improve
performance (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993; Jamieson et al., 2010). Anxiety
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and excitement have divergent effects on performance, but the experience of these two
emotions is quite similar. They are both felt in anticipation of events and are
characterized by high arousal. Unlike anxious versus calm feelings, which differ in high
versus low arousal, anxiety and excitement are arousal congruent, and minimal
interventions may be sufficient to shift valence and produce genuine feelings of
excitement. This notion builds on seminal work on the misattribution of arousal (e.g.,
Schacter & Singer, 1962). We know that when the source of arousal is ambiguous,
people often misunderstand the true source of their arousal. In contrast, we focus on
situations in which the source of arousal is obvious, such as asking people to sing in
front of strangers or to complete a difficult math task. After increasing anxious arousal,
we suggest a minimal, deliberate intervention to shift the experience of high arousal
from negative to positive valence (i.e., from anxiety to excitement).
Our research makes several theoretical contributions. First, it dives deeply into
an important omission in the emotion regulation literature. Previous work has not
considered the role of arousal congruency during emotional reappraisal, and very few
empirical studies have directly compared different substrategies of reappraisal (Shiota &
Levenson, 2012). The current research addresses these omissions and answers Han,
Lerner, & Keltner’s (2007) call to study the action tendencies related to both high
arousal and discrete positive emotions. We expect that reappraising one high arousal
emotion (anxiety) as another high arousal emotion (excitement) is easier and more
effective than trying to shift from high arousal (anxiety) to low arousal (calmness).
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Second, this research complements a body of work about misrepresenting
emotions. Previous work suggests that inauthentic emotional displays differ from
authentic expressions, and that deliberate attempts to express inauthentic emotions are
an act of emotional labor that can be physically and psychologically costly (e.g., Ekman,
1992; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Grandey, 2000, 2003; Cote, 2005; Morris & Feldman,
1996). In contrast, pre-performance anxiety and excitement may serve as a
counterexample to these findings. By “misrepresenting” anxious arousal as excitement,
we expect a genuine experience of excitement to follow.
Third, our research points to the labile nature that can exist between two
seemingly discrete and disparate emotions. By highlighting the fine line between
emotions like anxiety and excitement, we can better understand how individuals
experience two emotions simultaneously (i.e., mixed emotions or emotional
ambivalence, Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Rothman, 2011) or shift from one emotional
state to another (i.e., emotional transitions, Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011).
Anxiety
Anxiety is a discrete emotion characterized by high arousal, negative valence,
uncertainty, and a low sense of control (Gray, 1991; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985). Consistent with prior research, we conceptualize anxiety as “a state
of distress and/or physiological arousal in reaction to stimuli including novel situations
and the potential for undesirable outcomes” (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 44).
Threats that trigger anxiety can be quite minimal, such as the mere proximity of another
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individual or a fleeting unpleasant memory. Or they can be significant, such as the threat
of failure, embarrassment, or physical harm (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992).
The threats that elicit anxiety change over one’s lifespan. For example, anxiety is
triggered by anticipated separation from a primary caregiver at twelve months (Carlson
& Sroufe, 1995), monsters and ghosts around age four (Lentz, 1985), and public
speaking in adolescence and adulthood (e.g., Bamber, 1974). Extant anxiety research has
largely focused on trait anxiety (e.g., Endler, 1980; Eysenck, 1979, 1992, 1997; Kantor
et al., 2001), a personality characteristic similar to neuroticism that reflects an
individual’s susceptibility to anxiety (Spielberger, 1985). Recent work has focused on
state anxiety, a transient emotion that anyone can experience (e.g., Gino, Brooks, &
Schweitzer, 2012). Trait and state anxiety are inextricably linked. Individuals high in
trait anxiety experience state anxiety more frequently and in higher magnitudes than do
individuals with low trait anxiety (Spielberger, 2005).
Although anxiety is unpleasant and aversive, it can have positive effects on
behavior. For example, if individuals feel anxious far in advance of an event, it can
motivate effort and preparation through a process called defensive pessimism; when
individuals make negative appraisals about future events, they work harder to avoid
potential negative outcomes and prepare more thoroughly (e.g., Norem & Chang, 2002).
Similarly, the Yerkes-Dodson law describes an inverted U-shaped relationship between
anxiety and performance. Very low or high levels of anxiety are harmful, but moderate
levels of anxiety may improve motivation on tasks that demand stamina or persistence
(e.g., Broadhurst, 1957; Eysenck, Derakshan, & Santos; 2007).
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However, feeling very anxious shortly before or during a task tends to harm
cognition and performance, especially for non-experts. Anxiety drains working memory
and limits information processing. Anxious individuals waste working memory on
processes like worrying and ruminating instead of focusing on the task at hand (see
Eysenck, 1992 for a review).
Anxiety also negatively influences motivational mechanisms such as risk
aversion and self-confidence (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham,
1999). Recent work suggests that state anxiety lowers self-efficacy, the belief that one
can succeed on a specific task (see Bandura, 1997 for a review). Low self-confidence, in
turn, profoundly influences decision making and behavior. For example, anxious
negotiators make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit than neutral-state
negotiators. These effects are mediated by low negotiator self-efficacy (Brooks &
Schweitzer, 2011). Similarly, anxious individuals seek out and rely more heavily on
advice, even when the advice is obviously bad, because they do not feel confident in
their own ability to make good judgments (Gino et al., 2012).
Reappraising Anxiety as Calmness
Though anxiety tends to harm performance, pre-performance anxiety can be
managed. Emotion regulation scholars have compared the effectiveness of different
emotion regulation strategies for managing state anxiety. General consensus has
emerged that reappraisal is the most effective strategy for mitigating the experience of
state anxiety. Reappraisal has been defined as “a form of cognitive change that involves
construing an emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its emotional impact”
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(e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1993; Hofmann et al., 2009). For example, imagine an
individual who loses a loved one. He may initially appraise this event as tragic and feel
sad. But appraisal is not a one-shot process (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton,
1970; Monat et al., 1972; Scherer, 2001). After initially appraising the event as tragic, he
may search for new aspects about the situation, environment, or his own internal state,
leading him to re-evaluate the loss as symbolic rather than tragic, and reappraising his
sadness as calmness or pride.
A substantial literature demonstrates that reappraising negative emotions is more
effective than suppressing them (e.g., Gross, 1998, 2001; Gross & Levenson, 1993;
Hofmann et al., 2009). Suppression means that an individual continues to feel a certain
emotion, but masks or hides it from observers. Suppression can lead to a paradoxical
increase in the experience of the concealed emotion. In contrast to suppression,
reappraisal is more effective for reducing both the experience and the expression of
emotion, and reappraisal entails relatively low physiological, cognitive, and
interpersonal costs.
Previous work on anxiety reappraisal has focused on reappraising anxiety as
calmness. For example, Hofmann et al. (2009) suggests that reappraising anxiety as
calmness is more effective than suppressing or accepting anxiety for mitigating
physiological arousal (i.e., heart rate) and the subjective experience of anxiety.
However, previous research has overlooked the effects of reappraisal on subsequent
performance and has not considered shifting anxiety toward emotional states other than
calmness.
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Reappraising Anxiety as Excitement
We break new ground by examining the reappraisal process with respect to preperformance anxiety and excitement. Anxiety is characterized by negative appraisal,
uncertainty, and a lack of control, whereas excitement is characterized by positive
appraisal and optimism (e.g., McConnell et al., 1993). Individuals who feel anxious tend
to focus on the potential negative outcomes of future events and believe that those
outcomes are more likely to occur (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham,
1999). Those beliefs lead anxious individuals to have lower self-confidence, to be more
risk-averse than individuals in a neutral state, and to struggle with cognition
immediately before and during performance tasks (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Gino et al.,
2012). In contrast, individuals in an excited state tend to focus on the potential positive
outcomes of upcoming events and believe that they can achieve more positive outcomes,
compared to those in a neutral or anxious state (Ashby et al., 1999; Aspinwall & Taylor,
1997; Fredrickson, 2001; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; Scheier et al., 1986).
Though they have divergent effects on cognition, motivation, and performance,
the physiological experiences of anxiety and excitement are remarkably similar. Both
anxiety and excitement are characterized by high arousal, signaled by increased heart
rate (e.g., Smith & Bradley, 2005). Unlike reappraising anxiety as calmness, which
requires a physiological shift from high to low arousal as well as a cognitive shift from
negative to positive valence, reappraising anxiety as excitement requires only a shift
from negative to positive valence because anxiety and excitement are arousal congruent.
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Taken together, we expect that reappraising anxiety as excitement, compared to
reappraising anxiety as calmness, is easier and improves performance on important tasks
that typically make people very anxious.
Overview of Current Research
We test our predictions across several experimental studies. In a pilot study, we
investigate people’s intuitions about managing pre-performance anxiety. We expect that
most people believe trying to calm down (i.e., reappraising anxiety as calmness) is more
effective than reappraising anxiety as excitement. In Study 1, we test the effectiveness of
reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement before singing in front of a stranger.
In Studies 2 and 3, we directly compare the effects of reappraising pre-performance
anxiety as excitement versus calmness in two different behavioral domains: public
speaking and math performance. In Study 4, we explore the psychological mechanism
underlying this phenomenon: opportunity versus threat mindset. We expect that
reappraising anxiety as excitement primes an opportunity mindset, which in turn
improves performance.
Pilot Study: Lay beliefs
To motivate our main series of experiments, we conducted a pilot study to
investigate people’s lay beliefs related to anxiety regulation. We expect that lay beliefs
align with recent research on anxiety reappraisal: people intuitively believe that trying to
calm down is the best way to contend with pre-performance anxiety. We do not expect
individuals to anticipate the benefits of reappraising anxiety as excitement.
Method
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Participants
Three hundred participants completed this study online (Mage = 35.4 years, 159
males, 141 females) in exchange for $.50. Eighty-five percent of participants reported
full-time employment at the time of the survey, and 73% said they had a college degree
or higher.
Design and Procedure
We asked participants to read and answer questions about a hypothetical
scenario. We manipulated the focal actor in the scenario to test whether individuals’
responses would be different for the self versus a coworker (e.g., Polman, 2012):
“Imagine that you work in a large organization of about five hundred
employees. Tomorrow, [you are]/[your coworker is] scheduled to give a thirtyminute keynote speech in front of the whole company, including the CEO and
executive board. This makes [you]/[your coworker] feel extremely anxious.”
Participants answered two questions about the scenario. First, “What advice would you
give to [yourself]/[your coworker]?” (open-ended response). Second, “What is the best
advice?” (multiple choice: Try to relax and calm down, Try to cancel the speech or find
someone else to do it, Try to be excited instead of anxious). Participants finished by
answering questions about their public speaking experience, age, and gender.
We recruited two independent raters to analyze the content of participants’ openended responses. We asked the raters to categorize participants’ responses as advice to
accept anxiety, to hide anxiety, or to reappraise anxiety as excitement, calmness, anger,
or sadness. The raters were blind to our experimental hypotheses and experimental
condition, and inter-rater reliability was high (ϰ > .61).
Results
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On average, the raters coded 84.94% of the participants’ responses to the
question “What advice would you give?” as advice to try to relax or calm down (ϰ =
.62) and 21.45% of the responses as advice to try to get excited (ϰ = .54),

(1, N = 300)

= 37.89, p < 0.001. None of the responses were coded as advice to accept anxiety, hide
anxiety, or reappraise anxiety as anger or sadness.
In response to “What is the best advice?” when the focal actor was the self,
90.97% of participants chose “Try to relax and calm down,” 1.29% of participants chose
“Try to cancel the speech or find someone else to do it,” and 7.74% of participants chose
“Try to be excited instead of anxious,”

(2, N = 153) = 150.11, p < 0.001. We observed

the same pattern of results when the focal actor was a coworker. There were no
significant differences between the self and coworker conditions, and there were no
effects of age, gender, or public speaking experience.
Discussion
An overwhelming majority of people (more than 90%) believe the best way to
manage pre-performance anxiety is to “try to calm down” (i.e., reappraise anxiety as
calmness). On average, people do not implicitly anticipate performance benefits via
reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement.
Study 1: Singing Performance
In Study 1, we test whether individuals can reappraise anxiety as excitement
prior to a very anxiety-inducing task: singing in front of a stranger. We expect that, even
when directed to do so by an experimenter, reappraising anxiety as excitement will
increase subjective excitement and improve subsequent singing performance.
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In this study, we use randomly-assigned self-statements of emotion to induce
reappraisal (e.g., saying “I am excited” out loud). Explicit emotional self-statements are
pervasive and may do more than simply express inner feelings. They may provide
evidence of one’s internal state, influencing the reappraisal process and contributing to
the construction of subjective emotional experience. Like the happiness inspired by
putting a pencil between one’s teeth to simulate a Duchenne smile (e.g., Strack, Martin,
& Stepper, 1988), the power states induced by standing in powerful positions (Carney,
Cuddy, & Yap; 2010), or the positive psychological states induced by self-affirmations
(e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006), we expect self-statements of emotion to be selffulfilling.
Recent research in negotiations has found that emotional self-statements have
profound interpersonal consequences. For example, saying “I am angry” extracts
concessions from a counterpart, but may harm the long-term relationship (Van Kleef et
al., 2004a). Work in this domain has examined the interpersonal consequences of other
specific emotional statements, including self-statements of guilt, happiness,
disappointment, and regret (Van Kleef et al., 2004b, 2006, 2010). However, in this line
of work, researchers have used a simulated counterpart in their methodology, neglecting
the psychological and emotional processes of the individual making the emotional
statement. In other words, the observer of emotional statements has been the object of
study rather than the person making the statement, which is what we explore here.
Previous work on positive self-talk in sports psychology has tested the benefits
of issuing statements like “I can do it” on dart-throwing performance (Dagrou et al,
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1992; Van Raalte et al., 2005) and on the self-reported performance of professional
gymnasts, wrestlers, and divers (Weinberg et al., 1984; see Hardy, 2006 and Tod, Hardy,
& Oliver, 2011 for a review). However, self-talk has received little attention outside of
the sports domain. Most recently, Zell, Warriner, and Albarracin (2012) found that
individuals commonly use fragmented self-talk, characterized by the use of the second
person for the self (e.g., “You can do this”), leading up to threatening tasks. This
research, however, has not measured the behavioral effects of self-talk on performance.
We investigate the effects of self-talk on emotional reappraisal and performance in this
study.
Method
Participants
We recruited one hundred and thirteen native English-speaking students (54
male, 59 female) from a Northeastern university to participate in an experiment for pay.
On average, participants were 20.30 years old (SD = 3.30). Participants received a $5
show-up fee and could earn additional compensation up to $5 based on performance in
the study.
Design
Participants performed a karaoke song on a Nintendo Wii video game console,
using the “Karaoke Revolution: Glee” program. Prior to singing, we randomly assigned
participants to make one of three self-statements: “I am anxious,” “I am excited,” or no
statement. The main dependent variable was singing quality as measured by the karaoke
program’s voice recognition software.
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Manipulation Check
We conducted a manipulation check with a non-overlapping sample (N = 97)
drawn from the same population as the main study. The goals of this manipulation check
were 1) to test the familiarity of the target song, and 2) to examine the physiology (heart
rate) and psychology of self-statements as a means to reappraise anxiety.
We recruited ninety-seven participants (Mage = 20.27 years, 44 males, 53
females) from a non-overlapping sample to participate in a study in exchange for a $5
show-up fee. An experimenter guided participants through the study. First, the
experimenter told participants they would be singing the first verse of “Don’t Stop
Believing” by Journey in front of each other. We chose “Don’t Stop Believing” as the
target song because it can be performed easily in three different octaves (suitable for
both male and female participants). “Don’t Stop Believing” was also the 21st most
downloaded song in iTunes history and tends to be extremely familiar to English
speakers.
After announcing that they would sing in front of each other, the experimenter
randomly assigned each experimental group to make an emotional statement out loud.
Specifically, the experimenter read the following script: “Please deliver the following
randomly-assigned line out loud. When you deliver your line, really try to believe it.
Here is your line: ‘I am [anxious]/[excited]/[calm]/[angry]/[sad].’” There was also a
neutral condition in which participants made no self-statement. We included emotional
statements other than anxiety and excitement for a deeper understanding of how
emotional self-statements influence arousal and subjective emotional experience.
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After delivering their line out loud, participants were instructed to stand at the
front of the room to sing the opening phrase of the song:
“Just a small town girl, living in a lonely world. She took the midnight train
going anywhere. Just a city boy, born and raised in South Detroit. He took the
midnight train going anywhere.”
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Lang et al., 1993), we used heart rate as a
measure of physiological arousal. Throughout the study, each participant wore a pulse
oximeter on their non-dominant pointer finger. We asked participants to record their
heart rate (in PrBPM) at three different times throughout the study: resting, after
learning that they were going to sing, and after making their self-statement.
At the end of the study, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt
anxious and excited before singing, and to rate their recognition of the song (“I
recognized the song,” 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). We measured anxious
and excited feelings on seven-point scales (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree)
across five items adapted from Brooks & Schweitzer (2011, anxious, tense, nervous, α =
.86; excited, enthusiastic, α = .91). Participants also indicated their age and gender.
Across all conditions, participants rated the song as very recognizable (M = 6.61
out of 7, SD = 1.20) and indicated that they felt very anxious before singing (M = 5.81
out of 7, SD = 1.85). There were no effects of experimental condition on song
recognition or self-reported anxiety.
There was a main effect of experimental condition on self-reported excitement.
Participants who stated “I am excited” reported feeling significantly more excited before
singing (M = 3.56, SD = 1.35) than did participants in the other conditions (M = 1.98,

143
SD = 1.86), t (95) = 3.70, p < .001. There were no significant differences in subjective
excitement across the anxious, calm, angry, sad, and neutral conditions.
There was a significant increase in participants’ mean heart rate between resting
state (M = 73.65 PrBPM, SD = 11.92) and after finding out about the singing task (M =
78.43 PrBPM, SD = 11.88), t = -2.80, p = .006. Across all conditions, heart rate
remained high leading up to the singing task. There was not a significant difference in
participants’ heart rate between reading 2 (after finding out about the singing task) and
reading 3 (after making a self-statement of emotion, M = 77.81, SD = 11.19), p = .71.
There were no effects of experimental condition (self-statement) on heart rate.
The results from this manipulation check demonstrate that the target song was
very recognizable, that being asked to sing induces high arousal, and that making an
excited self-statement induces subjective excitement. Further, it demonstrates that
physiological arousal (as measured by heart rate) is not altered by the reappraisal
manipulations studied here.
Study 1 Procedure
For the main study, we recruited participants to the lab such that one participant
arrived every eight minutes for the duration of the study. Upon arrival, an experimenter
held participants in a waiting room where they completed an unrelated filler task.
A second experimenter brought participants into a second room one at a time.
First, participants read that they would be singing the song “Don’t Stop Believing” by
Journey in front of an experimenter on a karaoke program and that they would be paid
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based on their singing accuracy score. The “singing accuracy score” payment structure is
depicted in Figure 1.
------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------We told participants that when the experimenter asked, “How are you feeling?”
they were required to respond with a randomly-assigned emotional statement and that
they should try to believe it: “I am anxious” or “I am excited.” We also included a
condition where participants were not prompted for a response and did not make an
emotional statement (neutral condition). It was important to compare the effects of
making a self-statement to not making a self-statement because inaction can also
influence emotional experience (i.e., Andrade & Van Boven, 2010).
After participants read these instructions, the experimenter asked the following
question out loud: “How do you feel?” Participants responded by saying their assigned
statement out loud. Two participants were dismissed from the study for failing to
respond with the correct statement.
Next, a third experimenter accompanied the participant into a third room where a
Nintendo Wii was set up with a microphone and a television screen (see Figure 2 for a
photo of the experimental setup). To eliminate potential demand effects, the third
experimenter was blind to the experimental condition and hypotheses.
---------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
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--------------------------------The experimenter handed the microphone to the participant and said “You will
sing into this microphone. The lyrics will appear across the bottom of the screen.” The
participant sang “Don’t Stop Believing” using Konami’s Karaoke Revolution program
while the experimenter sat in front of him or her, watching. At the end of the song, the
karaoke program’s voice recognition software provided an objective performance score
on a scale of 0-100%. The singing accuracy score was an equally-weighted average of
the software’s measurement of volume (quiet-loud), pitch (distance from true pitch), and
note duration (accuracy of breaks between notes)4.
When they finished singing, participants completed the same self-report
measures of anxiety (α = .84) and excitement (α = .87) as we used in the manipulation
check. We also measured singing self-efficacy across three items adapted from Bandura
(1997, e.g., “I am confident in my singing ability,” 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly
agree, α = .83), and demographics (age, gender). At the end of the study, the
experimenter paid participants based on their singing accuracy score.
Results
Singing Performance
We conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the effect of
reappraisal condition on singing performance. We included reappraisal condition as the
independent variable, singing accuracy score as the dependent variable, and age and

4

Information provided by Konami in May 2012.
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gender as control variables5. There was a main effect of reappraisal condition on singing
accuracy, F(2,107) = 8.77, p < .005. Consistent with our expectation, singing accuracy
was highest in the “I am excited” condition (M = 80.52%, SD = 12.54), and was
significantly higher than in the no-statement condition (M = 69.27%, SD = 16.47), t
=3.12, p < .01. Singing accuracy was lowest in the “I am anxious” condition (M =
52.98%, SD = 24.54), and was significantly lower than in the no statement condition, t =
-3.62, p < .001. This pattern of results is depicted in Figure 3. There were no effects of
age or gender on singing accuracy.
-------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
-------------------------------------Subjective emotions
Consistent with the results of our manipulation check, self-reported feelings of
excitement were higher in the “I am excited” condition (M = 3.14, SD = 1.06) than in the
“I am anxious” condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.10), t = -2.10, p = .041. There were no
effects of reappraisal condition, age, or gender on self-reported anxious or neutral
feelings.
Self-efficacy
Singing self-efficacy was significantly higher after stating “I am excited” (M =
3.48, SD = 1.94) than after stating “I am anxious” (M = 2.29, SD = 1.68), t = -1.41, p =
.02, or after making no statement (M = 2.19, SD = 1.72), t = -1.62, p < .02.
For analytical consistency and transparency, we include participant age and gender as control variables
across all of our studies (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).
5
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However, self-efficacy did not fully mediate the effect of experimental condition
on task performance. When we included self-efficacy in the model, the effect of “I am
excited” versus no-statement condition on singing performance was reduced in
significance but did not become insignificant (from

= -5.63, p = .007, to

= -4.67, p =

.02), while the effect of self-efficacy remained significant ( = 2.83, p = .008). In a
bootstrap analysis, we found that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval from a
5000-sample bootstrap test did include zero (CI = [-.04, .32]), which does not indicate
mediation (MacKinnon et al., 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
Discussion
The findings from Study 1 demonstrate that self-statements of emotion can
induce reappraisal. By stating “I am excited” out loud, individuals reappraised their
anxiety as excitement and improved their subsequent singing performance.
Study 2: Public Speaking Performance
In Study 2, we directly compare the effects of reappraising anxiety as calmness
versus excitement in a work-relevant behavioral domain: public speaking. Public
speaking is common, especially in the workplace, and makes adults very anxious (e.g.,
Bamber, 1974). We expect that, compared to reappraising anxiety as calmness,
reappraising anxiety as excitement causes speakers to be more persuasive, confident,
competent, and persistent.
Method
Participants
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We recruited one hundred and forty native English-speaking students (63 male,
77 female) from a Northeastern university to complete a study in exchange for a $5
show-up fee. On average, participants were 20.24 years old (SD = 1.80).
Design & Procedure
Each participant was given two minutes to prepare a persuasive public speech
about “why you are a good work partner.” We told participants that they would deliver
the speech in front of an experimenter and that it would be recorded on a video camera
to be “judged later by a committee of peers.” These instructions were written to
maximize anxious arousal.
After preparing a speech but before delivering it, participants were randomly
assigned to make one of two self-statements to induce reappraisal: “I am excited” or “I
am calm.” Then they delivered their 2-3 minute speech on camera. The experimenter
was blind to condition and our hypotheses.
After delivering their speech, participants completed the same self-report
measures of anxiety (α = .78), excitement (α = .87), and self-efficacy (α = .87) from
Study 1, as well as their age and gender.
We recruited three independent raters who were blind to experimental condition
and our hypotheses. The raters watched the videos of the participants’ speeches, coding
them along several dimensions on 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) scales.
Participants were instructed to persuade the audience that they would be a good work
partner. Therefore, the raters used a two-item measure of persuasiveness (The speaker
was persuasive, The speaker would be a good work partner, α = .90). The raters also
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scored participants’ confidence (The speaker was confident, The speaker seemed selfassured, α = .92), anxiety (The speaker was anxious), excitement (The speaker was
excited), competence (The speaker was intelligent, The speaker knew what s/he was
talking about, The speech made sense, α = .79), and persistence (The speaker was
persistent). Inter-rater reliability was acceptably high across all measures (all ϰ’s > .64).
Results
Speech Ratings
We averaged across the three raters’ values for our analyses. We conducted
several analyses of variance (ANOVA’s) with speaker persuasiveness, confidence,
anxiety, excitement, competence, and persistence as dependent variables, reappraisal
condition (“I am excited” v. “I am calm”) as the independent variable, and age and
gender as control variables. A principle components analysis indicated separate factor
loadings for each of the dependent measures, and we report separate ANOVA’s for each
dependent variable.
Ratings of the speakers’ persuasiveness, competence, confidence, and
persistence differed significantly across experimental conditions. Supporting our
predictions, participants who stated “I am excited” before their speech were rated as
more persuasive (F(1, 136) = 11.87, p < .001), more competent (F(1, 136) = 4.78, p =
.03), more confident (F(1, 136) = 13.14, p < .001), and more persistent F(1, 136) = 3.99,
p = .048) than were participants who stated “I am calm” before their speech. Means and
standard deviations are included in Figure 4.
-------------------------------------
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Insert Figure 4 about here
------------------------------------There were no significant effects of reappraisal condition on the coders’ ratings
of speaker anxiety (p = .19) or excitement (p = .08). There were no effects of age or
gender.
Speech Duration
Participants were required to speak for at least two minutes and no longer than
three minutes. As an additional measure of speaker persistence, we conducted a t-test on
speech duration (in seconds) across reappraisal conditions. Participants in the “I am
excited” condition spoke longer during their speeches (M = 167 sec, SD = 26 sec) than
did participants in the “I am calm” condition (M = 132 sec, SD = 21 sec), t = 8.69, p <
.001. Speech duration (in seconds) and the coders’ subjective ratings of “persistence”
were positively correlated, r = .87, p < .02.
Self-Report Measures
We conducted three ANOVA’s with participants’ self-reported excitement,
anxiety, and self-confidence as dependent variables. We used reappraisal condition as
the independent variable, and we included age and gender as control variables.
Consistent with our findings from Study 1, participants reported feeling more excited
after stating “I am excited” (M = 4.75, SD =1.72) than after stating “I am calm” (M =
4.09, SD = 1.54), F(1, 136) = 5.60, p < .02. Self-reported self-efficacy was marginally
higher after stating “I am excited” (M = 5.62, SD = 0.91) than after stating “I am calm”
(M = 5.27, SD =1.20), F(1, 136) = 3.57, p = .06.
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Self-reported anxiety did not differ across conditions (p = .86), but was quite
high on average leading up to the public speaking task (M = 5.17 out of 7, SD = 1.17).
There were no effects of age or gender.
Discussion
Being asked to give a two-minute public speech on camera caused individuals to
feel very anxious. Compared to reappraising their anxiety as calmness by stating “I am
calm,” reappraising anxiety as excitement by stating “I am excited” caused individuals
to feel more excited, to speak longer, and to be perceived as more persuasive,
competent, confident, and persistent.
Study 3: Math Performance
In Studies 1-2, we found that reappraising pre-performance anxiety as
excitement can be accomplished by making a minimal self-statement (“I am excited”),
which improved performance across two anxiety-inducing performance tasks: karaoke
singing and public speaking. In Study 3, we extend our investigation in two ways: 1) we
manipulate reappraisal using minimal instructions (e.g., telling participants to “Get
excited”) rather than self-statements (e.g., asking participants to state: “I am excited”),
and 2) we use a different anxiety-inducing task, math performance, to explore highpressure performance in a non-public performance domain. Math anxiety is quite
pervasive (e.g., Maloney & Beilock, 2012). We expect that sincere efforts to reduce
anxiety (i.e., calm down) will not decrease anxious arousal. Instead, we expect that
trying to “get excited” will increase the subjective experience of excitement and improve
subsequent math performance.
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Method
Participants
We recruited 188 native English-speaking students (80 male, 108 female) from a
Northeastern university to participate in an experiment for pay. On average, participants
were 20.39 years old (SD = 1.88). Participants received a $5 show-up fee and could earn
additional compensation up to $4 based on performance.
Design
We asked participants to complete a difficult math task under time pressure. To
manipulate reappraisal, participants read one of three phrases in large letters
immediately before the math task began: “Try to remain calm” (calmness reappraisal),
“Get excited” (excitement reappraisal), or “Please wait a few moments” (neutral). Our
dependent measures included heart rate over time and performance (number of math
questions answered correctly).
Procedure
An experimenter seated participants in separate cubicles in front of computers.
All instructions and measures were presented to participants on the computer. First,
participants learned that their heart rate would be monitored with a wireless finger pulse
oximeter. They read instructions about how to place the pulse oximeter on their nondominant pointer finger (so they could complete the study using their dominant hand).
Next, participants read instructions to breathe deeply for ten seconds and record
their resting heart rate (reading 1). Throughout the study, participants recorded their own
heart rate by reading the beats per minute (PrBPM) displayed on the pulse oximeter and
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typing the value on the computer. After recording resting heart rate, they read
instructions for the main task:
“You will complete a very difficult IQ test made up of eight questions under time
pressure. For each question, you will have five seconds to select the correct
answer. You will receive feedback about your accuracy after each question. If
you answer every question correctly, you will earn $4. For each question you
answer incorrectly, you will lose fifty cents ($.50). Good luck minimizing your
loss.”
These instructions were written to maximize arousal. Time pressure, loss framing, and
the phrase IQ test tend to make people very anxious (Beilock, 2008; Beilock & Carr,
2005; Ramirez & Beilock, 2011). After reading the instructions, participants recorded
their current heart rate (reading 2).
The “IQ test” was actually a series of eight modular arithmetic math problems
adapted from Mattarella-Micke et al. (2011). Each question followed the same format
using invented symbols. For example, “16 ≡ 4 ◦ 3” meant “16 minus 4, divided by 3.”
For each problem, if the solution was a whole number (like here, 4), then the correct
answer was "true." If the solution was not a whole number, then the correct answer was
"false." Participants read instructions about the format of the math questions and
completed one practice question.
After answering the practice question and receiving feedback, participants were
randomly assigned to read one of three phrases displayed in large letters on the screen:
“Try to remain calm” to induce calm reappraisal, “Get excited’ to induce excitement
reappraisal, or “Please wait a few moments” (neutral). We included a neutral condition
for experimental control, but we did not expect significant differences between the
neutral and calm reappraisal conditions.
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After reading the task instructions and experimental manipulation, participants
recorded their heart rate (reading 3). Next, they completed the math task. For each
question, participants had five seconds to answer “true” or “false” before the task
progressed. After each question, participants received feedback about the accuracy of
their previous answer, and they reported their heart rate (readings 4-12). After the last
question, participants received accuracy feedback and the message, “this is the end of
the IQ test.”
When the task had ended, participants answered questions about their subjective
experience of anxiety (α = .69), excitement (α = .74), and self-efficacy (three items, α =
.86) during the study using the same measures we used in Studies 1-3. Participants also
answered demographic questions about their age and gender and were paid based on
their math performance.
Results
Math Performance
We conducted a one-way ANOVA with math performance (number of correct
answers out of eight) as the dependent variable, reappraisal condition as the independent
variable, and age and gender as control variables. We found a main effect of
experimental condition on math performance, F(1,186) = 4.18, p = .042. Performance
was nearly identical in the calm reappraisal (M = 2.94, SD = 1.75) and neutral
conditions (M = 2.94, SD = 1.91). Participants in the excitement reappraisal condition
scored significantly higher than did those in the calm and neutral conditions (M = 3.60,
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SD = 1.73), t = -2.12, p = .036. There were no effects of age or gender on math
performance.
Heart Rate
Consistent with our expectation that heart rate increases in anticipation of a
threatening task, there was a significant increase in mean heart rate between reading 1
(resting heart rate, M = 74.33 PrBPM, SD = 10.19) and reading 2 (after finding out
about the math task, M = 78.05 PrBPM, SD = 12.15), t = -3.22, p = .001. Heart rate
remained high leading up to and throughout the math task. Other than the initial increase
in heart rate between readings 1 and 2, there were no significant changes in mean heart
rate over time.
Consistent with our expectation that physiological arousal is difficult to suppress,
there were no significant effects of reappraisal condition on heart rate. Even when
instructed to “try to remain calm,” heart rate remained high. We depict heart rate over
time by experimental condition in Figure 5.
------------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here
------------------------------------Subjective excitement and anxiety
Controlling for age, gender, and task performance, there was a main effect of
experimental condition on the subjective experience of excitement, F(1,186) = 8.43, p =
.004. There was no difference in subjective excitement between the “try to remain calm”
(M = 4.41, SD = 1.39) and neutral conditions (M = 4.02, SD = 1.50), t = -1.54, p = .13.
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Participants in the excitement reappraisal condition reported feeling more excited during
the task by comparison (M = 4.73, SD = 1.36), t = 2.32 p = .021. There were no effects
of age or gender on self-reported excitement. There were no effects of reappraisal
condition, task performance, age, or gender on self-reported anxiety.
Self-efficacy
Controlling for age, gender, and performance, there was a main effect of
experimental condition on self-efficacy, F(1,186) = 5.61, p = .019. We found no
difference in self-efficacy between the “try to remain calm” (M = 5.49, SD = 1.21) and
neutral conditions (M = 5.17, SD = 1.33), t = -1.54, p = .153. Participants in the “Get
excited” condition reported higher self-efficacy by comparison (M = 5.66, SD = 1.01), t
= -2.35 p = .021. There was a significant positive correlation between task performance
and self-efficacy such that those who scored higher on the math task subsequently
reported more confidence in their math ability, r = .21, p = .03. There were no effects of
age or gender on self-efficacy.
Mediation
Since the neutral and calm reappraisal conditions did not differ on any measures,
we collapsed across these two conditions to assess mediation. Subjective excitement
mediated the effect of reappraisal condition on math performance. When we included
subjective excitement in the model, the effect of condition was reduced to nonsignificance (from

= .64, p < .004, to

= .49, p = .07) and the effect of subjective

excitement remained significant ( = .30, p < .002). A 5000-sample bootstrap test
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estimated a standardized indirect effect of .34 (SE = .038, 95% biased-corrected CI [.13,
.28]), indicating a significant indirect effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).
Discussion
Compared to reappraising anxiety as calmness or not reappraising anxiety at all,
reappraising anxiety as excitement increased subjective feelings of excitement, which
improved subsequent math performance. Once activated, an aroused state was difficult
to suppress. Even with explicit instructions to try to calm down, heart rate remained high
across all conditions leading up to and throughout the math task.
Study 4: Psychological Mechanism
In Studies 1-3, we found that reappraising pre-performance anxiety as
excitement can be accomplished with a subtle intervention, which improved
performance across three different anxiety-inducing domains: singing, public speaking,
and math performance. In Study 4, we investigate why reappraising anxiety as
excitement improves performance. Mittal and Ross (1998) suggest that individuals in a
positive affective state are more likely to interpret issues as opportunities, whereas
individuals in a negative affective state are more likely to interpret issues as threats. In
this way, excitement may prime an “opportunity” mindset, whereas trying to calm down
may perpetuate a “threat” mindset.
In turn, threat versus opportunity mindsets can profoundly influence cognition
and performance. For example, recent work by Crum et al. (forthcoming) demonstrates
the ease of shifting people’s stress-related mindsets with subtle reframing. They find that
priming a “stress-is-enhancing” mindset, as opposed to a “stress-is-deteriorating”
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mindset, increases cortisol reactivity and desire for feedback. Similarly, Alter et al.
(2010) demonstrate that subtly reframing a math test as a “challenge,” as opposed to a
“threat,” decreases stereotype threat and improves subsequent math performance among
high school and university students.
In general, individuals tend to view issues as threats unless there is strong
evidence to do otherwise (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Reappraising anxiety as excitement,
even with very subtle interventions, may be strong enough “evidence” to motivate an
opportunity mindset. We expect that reappraising anxiety as excitement will cause
individuals to adopt an opportunity mindset and improve their performance, whereas
reappraising anxiety as calmness will cause individuals to perpetuate the threat mindset
typically associated with feeling anxious. In this study, we test whether threatopportunity mindset mediates the effect of excitement reappraisal on math performance.
Method
Participants
We recruited 218 native English-speaking students (94 male, 124 female) from a
Northeastern university to participate in an experiment for pay. On average, participants
were 21.85 years old (SD = 3.48). Participants received a $5 show-up fee and could earn
additional compensation up to $4 based on performance.
Design & Procedure
We asked participants to complete an anxiety-inducing math task (same task as
in Study 3). To manipulate reappraisal, participants read one of two phrases in large
letters before they began the math task: “Try to remain calm” or “Try to get excited.”
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We measured each participant’s threat-opportunity mindset in two ways. First,
we asked participants to describe the math task (open-ended). Their responses would be
coded later by two independent raters on a seven-point threat-opportunity scale. Second,
participants completed a seven-item self-report measure adapted from Jackson & Dutton
(1988, e.g., “The IQ test is an opportunity to have fun,” “I view the test more as a
challenge than as a threat,” 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree, α = .76). For
experimental control, we also manipulated the presentation order of the mediation
measures. This produced a 2 (reappraisal: excitement v. calm) x 2 (mediator presentation
order: before v. after math task) experimental design.
Finally, participants completed the math task, reported their demographics (age,
gender), and were paid based on their performance. We recruited two independent raters,
who were blind to our hypotheses and experimental condition. We asked them to code
participants’ open-ended responses on a 7-point scale from threat (“This participant
viewed the task as threatening”) to opportunity (“The participant viewed the task as an
opportunity”). Inter-rater reliability was high (ϰ > .73).
Results
Math Performance
We conducted a one-way ANOVA with reappraisal condition (excitement v.
calm) as the independent variable, performance (number of correct answers out of eight)
as the dependent variable, and age, gender, and mediator measurement order (before v.
after task) as control variables. Replicating the findings of Study 3, there was a main
effect of reappraisal condition on math performance. Participants who reappraised their
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anxiety as excitement scored significantly higher on the math task (M = 3.42, SD = 1.74)
than did participants who reappraised their anxiety as calmness (M = 2.80, SD = 1.44),
F(1,213) = 8.09, p < .005. There was also an effect of gender on math performance.
Male participants scored significantly higher than did females (p = .03). There were no
effects of age or mediator measurement order on math performance.
Threat-Opportunity Mindset
To create a single measure of threat-opportunity mindset, we first averaged
across the two raters to create a coded mindset score ranging from 1 (threat) to 7
(opportunity) for each participant. Participants’ coded mindset score correlated
positively with their self-reported mindset score (r = .84, p = .01). We created a single
threat-opportunity mindset value by averaging each participant’s coded mindset score
and their self-reported mindset score. A low mindset value indicated a threat mindset,
whereas a high mindset value indicated an opportunity mindset.
We conducted a one-way ANOVA with reappraisal condition (excitement v.
calm) as the independent variable, threat-opportunity mindset value as the dependent
variable, and age, gender, and mindset measurement order as control variables. As we
predicted, participants who reappraised their anxiety as excitement had higher threatopportunity values than did participants who reappraised their anxiety as calm,
indicating an opportunity mindset (M = 3.75, SD = 0.72 vs. M = 3.36, SD = 0.72),
F(1,213) = 14.98, p < .001.
There was also a main effect of mindset measurement order on threatopportunity mindset values. Participants who reported their mindset after the math task
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viewed the task as less threatening than did participants who reported their mindset
before the math task (p = .04). There were no effects of age or gender on threatopportunity mindset values.
Mediation
We found that threat-opportunity mindset fully mediated the relationship
between reappraisal and math performance (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Controlling for
measurement order, the effect of reappraising anxiety as excitement was reduced (from β
= 0.26, p = .001, to β = 0.21, p < .01) when mindset was included in the equation, and
mindset was a significant predictor of performance (β = 0.34, p < .001). Including
mindset increased explained variance significantly by 13%, from R2 = .06 to R2 = .19, p
< .001. We also used bootstrapping to analyze mediation. Our bootstrap analysis showed
that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect
excluded zero (0.015, 0.203), suggesting a significant indirect effect (MacKinnon,
Fairchild, and Fritz, 2007).
Discussion
Previous work has found that people tend to adopt threat mindsets when they are
in negative affective states or in the absence of convincing positive evidence. The results
of Study 4 suggest that reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement, compared
to reappraising anxiety as calm, primes an opportunity mindset, which improved
subsequent math performance.
General Discussion
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People believe that trying to calm down is the best way to contend with preperformance anxiety (Pilot Study). However, across several experimental studies, we
find that reappraising anxiety as excitement is easier and more effective than trying to
calm down. Individuals can exert influence on their own reappraisal process by stating
“I am excited” or by being encouraged to “get excited.” Compared to reappraising
anxiety as calmness or not reappraising anxiety at all, reappraising anxiety as excitement
increased the subjective experience of excitement and improved performance in three
important performance domains: singing, public speaking, and math. This phenomenon
was mediated by threat versus opportunity mindset. Reappraising anxiety as excitement
primed an opportunity mindset, which improved subsequent performance.
Theoretical Contributions
This research makes several theoretical contributions that fundamentally advance
work on anxiety and emotion regulation broadly. First, this research fills an important
gap in the emotion regulation literature. Though prior work has examined the
interpersonal effects of emotional statements (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004), no work has
explored how a self-statement of emotion may influence one’s own experience of
emotion and subsequent behavior (i.e., the intrapsychic effects). The current findings
demonstrate that, before anxiety-inducing tasks, the way we talk about our feelings
influences whether we feel anxious or excited, which dramatically influences subsequent
performance.
Second, these findings complement previous work on misrepresenting emotions.
Prior research suggests that inauthentic emotional displays differ from authentic
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expressions, and that deliberate attempts to express inauthentic emotions represent an act
of emotional labor that can be psychologically costly (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Gross &
Levenson, 1993; Grandey, 2000, 2003; Cote, 2005; Morris & Feldman, 1996). In
contrast, our findings identify anxiety and excitement as a boundary condition.
Deliberately “misrepresenting” anxious arousal as “excitement” led to genuine increased
feelings of excitement and improved performance. This may be the case because anxiety
and excitement are arousal congruent, whereas prior work on emotional labor and
emotional reappraisal has focused on arousal-incongruent emotions such as happiness
and sadness.
Third, this work points to the labile nature that can exist between two discrete
emotions. A brief, simple statement (“I am excited”) or simple words of advice (“Get
excited”) were sufficient to shift individuals from experiencing a negatively-valenced
emotion (anxiety) to a positively-valenced emotion (excitement). These findings shed
light on the relative roles of valence (positive-negative) and arousal (high-low) in the
reappraisal process. Most previous work has focused on shifting both valence and
arousal (e.g., from anxiety to calmness), but we find that shifting valence and
maintaining high arousal may be easier and more effective. This suggests the importance
of arousal congruency during emotional reappraisal.
Future Directions
These findings are qualified by some limitations, which suggest a number of
directions for future research. First, in our studies, we randomly assigned participants to
issue very simple self-statements of emotion (e.g., “I am excited”). However,
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characteristics of the self-statement are likely to matter. For example, whether the
statement originates from the self (“I am excited”) or another person (“You are excited”)
may be important. Or, the timing of the emotional statement may matter. Saying “I am
excited” immediately before a performance task was beneficial, but perhaps saying “I
am anxious” a week in advance would motivate effort and preparation (e.g., Norem &
Chang, 1993). Also, in our studies, participants made an emotional statement in front of
one experimenter. In the future, researchers could vary the extent of publicity; selfstatements may operate differently when an individual says it out loud to an empty
room, in front of a mirror, in front of one observer, or in front of multiple observers.
In our studies, we focused on high arousal states. Future work should test how
arousal congruency applies to other discrete emotions, particularly low-arousal states.
For example, individuals may be able to easily reappraise feelings of boredom (negative
valence, low arousal) as calmness (positive valence, low arousal). Or perhaps for an
individual in a low-arousal state, saying “I am excited” alone can increase arousal,
energy, and motivation. On the other hand, consistent with work on emotional labor,
making a high-arousal statement in a low-arousal state may be psychologically and
physically taxing (e.g., Grandey, 2003). Additionally, mismatched arousal states and
self-statements may seem obviously insincere or sarcastic.
Our results reveal the effects of minimal emotional self-statements on one’s own
emotional experiences and subsequent performance. But when people talk about their
feelings, they often do so strategically for impression management (e.g., Van Kleef et
al., 2004). An extension of the current work could explore how self-statements of
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anxiety and excitement are perceived by others. Perhaps saying “I am excited” causes
observers to change their expectations or perceptions of the decision maker’s personality
and performance. Or the stated emotion may become contagious (e.g., Barsade, 2002).
Consistent with prior work (e.g., Lang et al., 1993), we used heart rate to
measure physiological arousal. We found that heart rate increased sharply in anticipation
of a difficult math task and singing in front of strangers. Even when explicitly told to
“try to calm down,” individuals’ heart rates remained high leading up to and throughout
those tasks. Future work could employ different physiological and neurological
measures for a deeper understanding of anxiety reappraisal. Previous work has used
physiological measures to investigate the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat
as well as regulatory focus (e.g., Blascovich, 1998; Creswell et al., 2005; Higgins, 1998;
Sherman et al., 2009). For example, research using fMRI data has found that a
prevention focus is associated with right frontal cortical activity, whereas a promotion
focus is associated with left frontal activity (Amodio et al., 2004). Similarly, recent work
by Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010) used neuroendocrine profiles to identify two key
hormones—testosterone and cortisol—that differentiate powerful individuals from
powerless individuals. Separately, Shiota and Levenson (2012) found differences
between detached versus positive reappraisal with respect to the subjective and
physiological experience of sadness and disgust. In line with this work, researchers may
be able to use testosterone, cortisol, blood pressure, or brain imaging analyses to further
differentiate pre-performance anxiety and excitement.
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We focused on math, singing, and public speaking as performance domains
because they make people feel very anxious. It will be important to explore the
generalizability of this phenomenon to other behavioral domains. For example, future
work could investigate how emotional statements influence job performance for
individuals with stressful jobs, especially over time with longitudinal data.
We found that reappraising anxiety as excitement increased subjective feelings
of excitement, but we did not find evidence that reappraising anxiety as excitement
decreased subjective feelings of anxiety. Work on reappraisal should examine if this
generalizes to other mixed emotions. For example, consider a guilty pleasure. Does
reappraising guilty feelings as pleasurable decrease guilt or only increase happiness,
momentarily masking one’s guilt? It is possible that emotional reappraisal can operate in
an additive way. That is, one emotional state may build on another emotional state,
rather than a shift or a replacement of one emotional state by another.
We find that reappraising anxiety as excitement is easier and more effective than
trying to calm down leading up to anxiety-inducing events. However, there may be
effective strategies—such as meditation, rituals, or expressive writing—that people can
use to calm down and reduce arousal effectively before high-pressure tasks (e.g.,
Ramirez & Beilock, 2011; Pennebaker, 1997; Damisch et al., 2010). More work is
needed to understand the most effective ways for reducing arousal in high-stress
domains. Similarly, there may be situations in which expressing or feeling excitement is
not beneficial. For example, feeling or expressing excitement during a negotiation may
convey valuable information to a counterpart that would be better kept private.
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In general, positive emotions have been found to be less differentiated than
negative emotions (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Van Boven & Johnson-Graham,
2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). More research is needed to understand how the
excitement elicited by saying “I am excited” relates to other discrete positive emotional
states such as happiness, pride, or enthusiasm (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010).
Practical Implications
Our findings demonstrate the profound control and influence we have over our
own emotions. The way we verbalize and think about our feelings helps to construct the
way we actually feel. Saying “I am excited” represents a simple, minimal intervention
that can be used quickly and easily to prime an opportunity mindset and improve
performance. This tool may be particularly helpful for managers in organizations to
motivate their employees. For example, advising employees to say “I am excited” before
important performance tasks or simply encouraging them to “get excited” may increase
their confidence, improve performance, and boost beliefs in their ability to perform well
in the future.
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that saying “I am excited” improves subsequent
performance, but the converse may also be true. Highly-skilled individuals may be more
likely to say “I am excited” before they tackle challenging tasks. In this way, emotional
self-statements could operate in an upward spiral process in which successful
individuals are more likely to express excitement, and saying “I am excited” then
improves subsequent performance. High performers may be even more likely to express
excitement the next time, and so on (Garland, Gaylord, & Fredrickson, 2011).
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Prescriptively, we should consider building self-confidence early. A small, early boost
of self-confidence may set individuals on a positive trajectory that could proliferate over
time.
Important work in positive psychology suggests that happiness in life comes
from the frequency, not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect (Diener,
Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991; Shiota, 2006). Building on this work, we expect that issuing
multiple positive self-statements such as “I am excited” does not produce diminishing
marginal returns. On the contrary, the more often individuals reappraise their preperformance anxiety as excitement, the more likely they may be to trigger upward
motivational spirals, and the happier and more successful they may become. Instead of
trying to “Keep Calm and Carry On,” perhaps the path to success begins by simply
saying “I am excited.”
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Singing accuracy payment scheme (Study 1)
Figure 2. Photo of karaoke singing setup (Study 1)
Figure 3. Singing performance by condition (Study 1)
Figure 4. Public speaking performance by condition (Study 3)
Figure 5. Heart rate over time in the repeated math task (Study 4)
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